78 statement or declaration as an element of the criminal classification. Accordingly, consideration of whether such offenses had been committed focused on whether a statement or declaration had been made that attributed to another person an offense which could expose that person to a disciplinary procedure or “cause considerable prejudice to the reputation, standing or interests of the person offended,” or in which another person was “insult[ed], discredit[ed], dishonor[ed] or slight[ed],” and in determining the dolus of the author of such conduct. 159. The Court has noted that the First Criminal Trial Court and the Third Chamber of the Court of Criminal Appeal presumed the dolus of the accused, because he did not retract the statements he had made, but rather ratified them, and owing to his level of intellectual preparation and his knowledge of the Itaipú public works which, in the judge’s opinion, implied that “he knew perfectly well who his statements were aimed at, their scope, and the damage they could cause.” Also, based on these conclusions, the judges assumed that Mr. Canese intended to injure or insult the image, reputation, credit or interests of the members of the CONEMPA board of directors. 160. To illustrate the reasoning of the criminal courts, the Court deems it pertinent to underscore what was established in the judgment of first instance when the judge stated that: […] it should be noted here that the defendant appeared before this court on various occasions accompanied by several political leaders and party members, which led this court to conclude that what he stated on those occasions was evidently intentional. […] […T]he time has come to determine clearly the result of these preliminary proceedings, opened to investigate the offenses for which the action has been filed, and the court reaches the obvious conclusion that the defendant has not been able to refute the accusation that he intentionally committed the offenses classified in Articles 370 and 372 of the Penal Code. 161. Based on the foregoing, the Court finds it evident that both the First Criminal Trial Court and the Third Chamber of the Court of Criminal Appeal presumed the dolus of Mr. Canese and, based on this, they demanded that he should refute the existence of his punishable intention. Hence, these courts did not presume the innocence of the defendant. The Court therefore concludes that the State violated Article 8(2) of the American Convention to the detriment of Mr. Canese. 162. Regarding the restriction to leave the country, the Court has indicated that this restriction could constitute a substitution for imprisonment, if it continues to be applied when it has ceased to fulfill its function as a procedural guarantee (supra para. 129).149 In the instant case, it has been established, in accordance with the aforementioned parameters, that the restriction of freedom of movement applied to Mr. Canese during almost eight years and four months became unnecessary and disproportionate (supra paras. 131, 134 and 135) to ensure that he did not evade his criminal liability should the sentence be executed. In the practice, this signified anticipating the sentence imposed but never executed, which constitutes a violation of the right to presumption of innocence established in Article 8(2) of the Convention. c) Regarding to right to defense 149 Cf. Case of Suárez-Rosero, supra note 140, para. 77.