81 for review, in which he requested the retroactive application of the new legislation, which was denied expressly by the Supreme Court of Justice of Paraguay on two occasions, until in December 2002, Paraguay’s maximum court absolved Mr. Canese, because it considered, inter alia, that it was necessary to apply the penal legislation in force; and c) The State “has failed in its obligation to respect and guarantee […] a proceeding which respects the principle of legality and non-retroactivity […], all in violation of Article 1(1) of the American Convention.” Arguments of the State 170. Regarding Article 9 of the Convention, the State indicated: a) In its final written arguments, that, on December 11, 2002, the Supreme Court of Justice of Paraguay delivered decision and judgment No. 1362, in which it absolved Ricardo Canese totally of guilt and pardoned him, by applying the most favorable criminal norm, in response to the appeal for review filed on August 12, 2002, by Ricardo Canese against the final judgment against him. He questioned the adverse judgment by arguing, among other matters, that a more favorable norm had been promulgated subsequently; b) In its brief answering the application, and with observations on the brief with requests and arguments, that it endorsed the Commission’s opinions regarding the scope and content of the principles of legality and retroactivity, but, in this specific case, it had not violated the content of these principles; c) In its brief answering the application, and with observations on the brief with requests and arguments, with regard to the appeal for review, that the criminal procedure norms “establish that the legal actors are: 1) the person convicted; 2) the spouse, companion or direct next of kin to the fourth degree or by adoption, or to the second degree by marriage, if the person convicted has died; and 3) the Attorney General’s office representing the person convicted. [...W]henever he filed an appeal for review, the legal actor never requested that the case should be reviewed as regards application of the most favorable norm, which [...] did not benefit him as far as imprisonment was concerned; while, for the fine to be applied as the sole sanction, the superior court must rule on the substance of the decision that has been opposed, and this [...] was never contested. Accordingly, it [can]not agree with the contents of point 109 of the Commission’s application;” and d) In its brief answering the application, and with observations on the brief with requests, arguments and evidence, that, when defining the imprisonment regime, the new Paraguayan penal laws have established that it “will have a minimum duration of six months and a maximum of twenty-five years.” Consequently, “when the penal norm does not refer to the minimum sanction, it must be understood that the minimum length of the sanction is six months.” Considerations of the Court