60 The limits of acceptable criticism are accordingly wider as regards a politician as such than as regards a private individual. Unlike the latter, the former inevitably and knowingly lays himself open to close scrutiny of his every word and deed by both journalists and the public at large, and he must consequently display a greater degree of tolerance. No doubt Article 10 para. 2 (art. 10-2) enables the reputation of others - that is to say, of all individuals - to be protected, and this protection extends to politicians too, even when they are not acting in their private capacity; but in such cases the requirements of such protection have to be weighed in relation to the interests of open discussion of political issues.133 103. Thus, in the case of public officials, individuals who exercise functions of a public nature, and politicians, a different threshold of protection should be applied, which is not based on the nature of the subject, but on the characteristic of public interest inherent in the activities or acts of a specific individual. Those individuals who have an influence on matters of public interest have laid themselves open voluntarily to a more intense public scrutiny and, consequently, in this domain, they are subject to a higher risk of being criticized, because their activities go beyond the private sphere and belong to the realm of public debate.134 Therefore, in the context of the public debate, the margin of acceptance and tolerance of criticism by the State itself, and by public officials, politicians and even individuals who carry out activities subject to public scrutiny, must be much greater than that of individuals. The directors of CONEMPA, a consortium contracted to execute a large part of the construction work of the Itaipú hydroelectric power plant fall within this premise. 104. Based on the foregoing considerations, the Court will decide whether, in this case, the subsequent imposition of criminal liability with regard to the alleged abusive exercise of the right to freedom of thought and expression by statements on matters of public interest, may be considered to comply with the requirement of necessity in a democratic society. In this respect, it should be recalled that penal laws are the most restrictive and severest means of establishing liability for an unlawful conduct. 105. The Court considers that, in the proceedings against Mr. Canese, the judicial bodies should have taken into account that he made his statements in the context of an electoral campaign for the presidency of the Republic and with regard to matters of public interest; circumstances in which opinions and criticisms are issued in a more open, intense and dynamic way, according to the principles of democratic pluralism. In the instant case, the judge should have weighed respect for the rights or reputations of others against the value for a democratic society of an open debate on topics of public interest or concern. 106. The criminal proceeding, the subsequent sentence imposed on Mr. Canese for more than eight years, and the restriction to leave the country applied during almost eight years and four months, facts which are the grounds for this case, constitute an unnecessary and excessive punishment for the statements that the alleged victim made in the context of the electoral campaign concerning another candidate to the presidency of the Republic on matters of public interest. They also limited the open debate on topics of public interest or concern and restricted Mr. Canese’s exercise of freedom of thought and expression to emit his opinions for the remainder of the electoral campaign. In the circumstances of the instant case, there was no 133 Cf. Eur. Court H.R., Case of Dichand et al. v. Austria, supra note 120, para. 39; Eur. Court H.R., Case of Lingens vs. Austria, supra note 120, para. 42. 134 Cf. Case of Herrera-Ulloa, supra note 15, para. 129.