70 d) With regard to the procedural activity of the interested party, Mr. Canese did not carry out any delaying activities during the proceedings in first and second instance; he even accepted the content of the press articles on which the accusation was founded and the evidence he offered was rejected. “Even if the petitioner had not acted with due diligence during the proceedings, [...] the ten years that the proceedings lasted, which included measures that restricted freedom of movement, were excessive for an offense whose punishment could only be one year’s imprisonment;” e) The judicial authorities acted with “manifest negligence,” directly contributing to the “delay in the proceeding.” “[Mr.] Canese was never able to argue that the articles on which the accusation was founded were true, and the evidence he offered was not accepted; consequently, it is not reasonable for the appeal to have taken three years, and that the appeals for review were finally decided in May 2002;” f) There was an “unjustified delay” in the proceedings filed against Mr. Canese, because eight years elapsed from the time the judgment of first instance was delivered until the judgment was considered executed in May 2002; g) From the documents in the case file, it is evident that the order which permanently restricted Mr. Canese’s freedom of movement was based on the judgment of first instance. The Paraguayan Penal Code under which Mr. Canese was convicted did not establish the prohibition to leave the country as part of the sanction, so it should be considered “a preventive measure adopted to ensure compliance with the final sanction that might be imposed;” h) The State did not justify the necessity to restrict Mr. Canese from leaving national territory on a permanent basis, because neither the existence of a lawsuit against him, nor the sentence delivered in first instance, which was not final, necessarily provided justification. Mr. Canese even abandoned national territory with permissions obtained by means of petitions for habeas corpus, which suggests that the restriction was unnecessary and disproportionate, and that the Paraguayan justice system itself did not consider he would abscond or evade the proceedings. Also, the Paraguayan jurisdictional bodies contradicted each other by denying Mr. Canese’s requests to leave the country; i) The criminal proceedings filed against Mr. Canese and the restriction of his freedom of movement for eight years exceeded the reasonable time to which this kind of measure should be limited; particularly taking into account that the sanction Mr. Canese could have faced was two months’ imprisonment and a fine; and j) The restriction to leave the country imposed on Ricardo Canese became an excessive and anticipated punitive measure, in violation of the principle of innocence established in Article 8(2) of the American Convention in relation to the general obligation to respect and guarantee rights established in Article 1(1) thereof, because it lasted so long and without any justification, despite the remedies filed in the domestic sphere to counter it. Arguments of the representatives of the alleged victim