3 order to protect collectively the members of a whole community,19 even though the basis of action is the breach - or the probability or imminence of breach - of individual rights. (par. 4). 8. As for the broad scope of the obligations erga omes of protection, in my Concurring Opinion in the Inter-American Court’s Advisory Opinion OC-18 on the Juridical Condition and Rights of Undocumented Migrants (of September 17, 2003), I noted that the jus cogens (from whence the obligations erga omnes emanate)20 characterizes them as being objective of necessity. They thus encompass all the parties for whom the legal norms were intended (omnes), whether they be members of public organs of the State or private persons (par. 76). I went on to write the following: (...) In a vertical dimension, the obligations erga omnes of protection bind both the organs and agents of (State) public power, and the individuals themselves (in the inter-individual relations). (...) as to the vertical dimension, the general obligation, set forth in Article 1(1) of the American Convention, to respect and to ensure respect for the free exercise of the rights protected by it, generates effects erga omnes, encompassing the relations of the individual both with the public (State) power as well as with other individuals (particuliers).21 (pars. 77-78). 9. Thus, given the circumstances of the present Matter of the Urso Branco Prison, as narrated in the Court’s order, the State cannot disclaim responsibility for the human rights violations (the rights to life and to humane treatment) that occurred in that prison merely because the acts of violence that resulted in those violations were committed by some inmates at the prison against other inmates. The State’s responsibility is immediately engaged, from the moment those violations occurred,22 regardless of pending legislative reforms or administrative measures (some of which have been pending for a long time). The State has an ineluctable duty of protection erga omnes, even in relations between individuals, inasmuch as victims and perpetrators alike were in the State’s custody. 10. It is true that throughout the public hearing this Court held on June 28, 2004, the parties demonstrated a spirit of procedural cooperation, which this Court has viewed in a positive light. Nevertheless, the answers given to the various questions that I asked of the parties (the petitioners seeking provisional measures, the InterAmerican Commission and the Brazilian State) during that hearing made it clear that the situation at the Urso Branco Prison is still one of extreme gravity and urgency, in 2 . Suggesting an affinity with the class actions. 20 . In this same Opinion I wrote the following: “By definition, all the norms of jus cogens generate necessarily obligations erga omnes. While jus cogens is a concept of material law, the obligations erga omnes refer to the structure of their performance on the part of all the entities and all the individuals bound by them. In their turn, not all the obligations erga omnes necessarily refer to norms of jus cogens.” (par. 80). 21 . Cf., in this respect, in general, the resolution adopted by the Institut de Droit International (I.D.I.) at the 1989 Santiago de Compostela session (Article 1), in: I.D.I., 63 Annuaire de l'Institut de Droit International (1989)-II, pp. 286 and 288-289. 22 . Concerning the finding that the State’s international responsibility was engaged, cf. my opinion (which I presented to this Court today) in the case of the Gómez Paquiyauri Brothers vs. Peru (Judgment of July 8, 2004), paragraphs 11-18. And for a study on this subject, cf. A.A. Cançado-Trindade, "A Determinação do Surgimento da Responsabilidade Internacional dos Estados", 26 Revista da Faculdade de Direito da Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais - Belo Horizonte (1978) pp. 158-199; A.A. CançadoTrindade, O Direito Internacional em um Mundo em Transformação, Rio de Janeiro, Ed. Renovar, 2002, pp. 371-408.