167. Therefore, the Court considers that it was not demonstrated that the failings of the initial investigative proceedings, in relation to the overall efforts carried out by the State, had a decisive impact on the clarification of the facts or on the final outcome of the processes followed with respect to the material authors. B.1.2. Criminal Proceedings 168. The Court will now analyze the alleged irregularities in certain procedures followed in the criminal trials, the alleged obstructions and threats made in the case, as well as the proceedings conducted against those presumed responsible. B.1.2.1 Inquiries in the proceedings 169. The Court emphasizes that, at the request of the presumed victims, a specialized Prosecutor (ad hoc) was appointed to focus exclusively on the investigation of the case (1128-98). Likewise, the Court notes that the Prosecutor carried out various inquiries in the different proceedings. Nevertheless, it should be pointed out that there were several changes of judges and prosecutors in the course of the proceedings (supra para. 109). 170. Furthermore, the Court notes that although the procedural momentum was the responsibility of the Public Prosecutor’s Office,263 the judges, based on the principle of effective judicial protection,264 should have acted with due diligence, ensuring prompt trial proceedings. In this regard, the Court notes that during the various criminal proceedings, there were several delays265 and omissions,266 particularly by the judges of the First 263 Cf. Law of the Public Prosecutor’s Office, supra, “Article 1. The Public Prosecutor’s Office is a professional and specialized body, free of all political sectarian interference, functioning independently of the powers and organs of the State, which is responsible for accomplishing the following goals and objectives: 2. Collaborate with and safeguard the prompt, proper and efficient administration, especially in criminal matters, conducting the investigation of the crimes until discovering those responsible and prosecuting them before competent law courts, through the exercise of public criminal proceedings.” 264 Cf. Case of Myrna Mack Chang, supra, para. 210 and Case of Suárez Peralta, supra, para. 93. Cf. Code of Criminal Procedure, supra, “Article 182. The investigative judge should conduct all the investigations conducive to establishing the corpus deliciti, taking advantage of the first moments to collect evidence and prevent its disappearance or prevent the perpetrators or those involved in the crime from going into hiding or entering into agreements to prepare statements that result in impunity. Therefore, the practice of all investigations aimed at clarifying the truth of material facts of the process should be undertaken immediately.” 265 In this respect, based on domestic legislation, several delays in the proceedings of the case can be pointed out, specifically: a) excessive prolongation of the indictment proceeding: for example, the criminal inquiry against one of the presumed intellectual authors remained at the preliminary stage for four years (File of attachments to the State’s response, page 5849), contrary to the provisions of Article 174 of the Code of Criminal Procedure which established that “preliminary proceedings shall be public except for those which must remain secret in the interests of justice and shall not last more than one month; the release order or the detention order shall be issued within six days according to the merits of the case; b) the gathering of evidence within the procedural times established by law for procedures requested by the Prosecutor of the examining judges: for example, almost 16 months after the citation to hear the judgment in case 1128-98, against Oscar Aurelio Rodríguez, on August 20, 2001 (File of attachments to the State’s response, page 7214), to the issuance thereof, on December 11, 2002 (File of attachments to the State’s response, pages 7256 to 7270), contrary to the provisions of paragraph 381 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in force at the time, which required that the Judge hand down a judgment within the period of the 10 days following the citation. It is worth mentioning that the Prosecutor in charge requested the judgment on ten occasions (File of attachments to the State’s response, pages 7217, 7219, 7221, 7223, 7226, 7229, 7231, 7233, 7237 and 7253). Similarly, almost four months passed between April 25, 2006, when the motion for dismissal of José Ángel Rosa was rejected (File of attachments to the State’s response, page 5996) and the reissuing of the arrest warrant for him, on August 14, 2006 (File of attachments to the State’s response, page 6009), in contravention of Article 105 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which states that, “[…] when the terms are not defined [for conducting a judicial proceeding], it is understood that it should be done without delay” (File of attachments to the State’s response, page 4928); c) delays in the execution of arrest warrants: for example, approximately one month and a half after the court of first instance received the decision of the Third Court of Appeals to order the arrest warrant for José Ángel Rosa (File of attachments to the State’s response, pages 5956 to 51