17. The petitioner alleges that by illegally arresting them and encouraging their exile, the State prevented the victims from providing the services for which they were contracted. It also introduced “legislation” preventing them from receiving the earnings they would have been entitled to during the time when the illegal situation kept them from working. The petitioner also claims that the right of equality before the law was breached in that those agents of the public administration who continued to work, and those who did not on account of force majeure, continued to receive their salaries. Being a “detainee” must be considered an instance of force majeure and, consequently, must be covered by the terms of Article 14.c of Decree 3413 of 1979. 18. The petitioner believes that the right to private property was violated, which is closely related to the guarantee of equality before the law and the right of fair remuneration for work. In this regard, it holds that the right of property covers all the credits, expectations, and assets in general that in any way make up a person’s patrimony. In particular, wages and the corresponding right to receive them are, on account of both their nature and their purpose, an expression of the right of property and, that being so, the State is obliged to protect them. 19. The petitioner also claims that the right to a justice and fair trial was violated in that, first, the judge did not rule on the legal and factual allegations put forward in the suit and, second, he introduced a completely spurious issue into the case, saying that the events that led to their absence from work were eminently political in nature and the result of actions by the executive branch and that therefore the General Tax Directorate could not be held responsible for them. With this, the judge introduced a defense that had not been used by the defendant at trial; this was therefore an arbitrary action in that the affected party was unable to discuss its admissibility, thus undermining the right of defense as guaranteed by the Constitution. B. The State’s position 20. The State maintains that this claim is based on the payment obligations of the General Tax Directorate as the employer and that the administrative proceedings initiated, pursuant to Article 39 of Decree 1798/80, ruled that earnings are not to be paid when the suspension arises from actions unrelated to work, except for the time following release and prior to a return to work being authorized. Consequently, judicial decisions under that jurisdiction, in accordance with current law and jurisprudence, have maintained that “no payment shall apply when 6