26 72. In cases concerning deprivation of liberty, such as with the instant case, the habeas corpus remedy constitutes, among the indispensable judicial guarantees, the most suitable means to ensure freedom, oversee the respect for life and personal integrity of the individual, to ensure that the detainee is brought before the court in charge of verifying the legality of the detention, as well as to avoid disappearances or uncertainty about detention centers, and to protect the individual from torture or other forms of cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment.90 These criteria are expressly embodied in Articles X and XI of the ICFDP, specifically when referring to forced disappearance of people. 73. During the time the writ of habeas corpus was filed to determine the whereabouts of Mr. Anzualdo Castro, the set of rules governing this remedy established that such remedy was inadmissible “when “the injured party opts to institute proceedings in the general jurisdiction.”91 Consequently, for a situation like the one of the instant case, this provision disregarded the fact that both procedures have different purposes and contemplated the consequence that the writ of habeas corpus was impracticable for protection purposes it was supposed to fulfill and therefore, rendered the analysis on the lawfulness of the detention unrealistic. 74. Under Article 7(6) of the Convention, this protection mechanism “may not be restricted or abolished”; therefore, said ground for inadmissibility is in total breach of the conventional provision. Likewise, the decision that denied the habeas corpus was based on the absence of sufficient evidence to prove the wrongdoing of the state agents considered to be responsible for the disappearance of Mr. Anzualdo, that is, it made the remedy dependent on the criminal investigation, which, at the end, turned out to be totally ineffective to determine his whereabouts (infra paras. 128-140). This proves a clear confusion regarding the purpose of the habeas corpus. 75. In addition, according to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, since the coup d’état of April 2002, the implementation of forced disappearance as practice became heightened and created a climate in which the habeas corpus as a legal remedy turned to be ineffective92. It was a widespread practice where “the justice administrators failed to protect the citizens’ rights, by declaring the writs of habeas corpus inadmissible” and where the Public Prosecutor’s Office “failed to exercise its duty to monitor the strict respect for human rights that needed to be shown while carrying out detentions and proved to be impassive to the requests victims’ next-of-kin” and it did not comply with its duty to appropriately investigate into the crimes, for its lack of independence from the Executive power93. This had a 88 Cf. motion to appeal filed by Félix Vicente Anzualdo Vicuña on February 22, 1994 (record of evidence, volume V, appendix 7 to the application, pages 1714). 89 Cf. court order issued by the Sixth Criminal Court in and for Lima in the court file Nº 02-94, of February 23, 1994 (record of evidence, volume V, appendix 7 to the application, page 1715). 90 Cf. Case of Neira Alegría et al. V. Perú. Supra note 43 para. 82; Case of La Cantuta V. Peru, supra note 58, para. 111; Case of the Serrano Cruz Sisters V. El Salvador. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of March 1, 2005. Series C No. 120, para. 79. See also Habeas corpus in Emergency Situations (Art. 27(2), 25(1) and 7(6) American Convention on Human Rights). Advisory Opinion OC-8/87 of January 30, 1987, Series A Nº.8, para. 35. 91 Section 6.3) of Habeas Corpus and Amparo Act 23.506 of December 8, 1982. 92 Cf. Final Report of the CVR, 2003, volume VIII, General Conclusions, para. 128, available at http://www.cverdad.org.pe/ifinal/index.php. See also, Case of Gómez Palomino V. Perú, supra note 63, para. 54.1.