7 (taking into account the pattern of behavior of the repressive State or the time elapsed between the disappearance and the judicial analysis of this fact) and therefore, such assumption produces full legal effects, the court would be, strictly speaking, sustaining that the disappearance has ended and instead, another situation and another violation have arisen: arbitrary deprivation of life. Then, the court would enter into the analysis of both violations, successive, and the consequences thereof. 20. The issue seems to have been solved – I do not know if for ever or for the moment- in favor of the idea that the forced disappearance entails an infringement of the right to protection of life taking into account that such disappearance may lead to death. This point of view puts the idea of risk in the center of the scene. In order to assume that death is the ultimate data of the disappearance, the analyst notes, as I said a pattern followed in many cases of disappearance, the context in which this occurs and the possibility of assuming, in time, that the individual deprived of liberty has finally lost his or her life. Therefore, an uncertain fact, not proven but probable, is added to the unequivocal precept of disappearance: the risk of violation of another legal interest, though this violation has still not been committed (and not even tried, perhaps). 21. In line with these considerations, it can be mentioned that the State responsible for the disappearance has violated the duty to ensure the right to life. This obligation implies the adoption – what has not happened- of all the measures necessary to protect such right and avoid putting it at risk. Under the same or very similar reasoning, can we bring up other violations, very different and distant, bearing in mind that the facts prove, in the case of the missing person, that the State has neither taken the necessary measures to ensure the individual the exercise of such other rights to which I referred, including but not limited to, in the previous paragraphs? 22. The judgment to which this opinion refers introduces a relevant novelty. In fact, it considers that the forced disappearance violates the right to juridical personality, embodied in chapter 3 of the American Convention. This statement of the judgment also entails questions that I mention herein. Upon considering that there is violation of this precept (not in the specific case and for the circumstances of the case, which may be sufficient to prove that other violation, but in any hypothesis of forced disappearance, per se), the Court agrees with the approach that have put forward, for quite some time, some parties to the cases before the Inter-American system.