9 27. If this is like that- I use a conditional form: “if it is”-, the forced disappearance, a fact attributable to the State, does not seem to necessarily involve a denial or disregard for the entitlement to rights, like there would be if an individual was to be considered "a thing", and not "an individual" (which occurs in cases of slavery, for example) or if the personality of a social aggregate would be explicitly denied (as with the case of indigenous groups, examined by the Inter-American Court), with the resulting violation of individual rights that may find its source, framework and protection in the collective rights of a group to which the personality is denied. 28. The Judgment delivered in the case of Anzualdo Castro, which causes many questions, has set out the clarification of the issue under certain concepts that are the basis, according to the decision itself, for the thesis by which there is a violation of Article 3. I am not referring to mere statements taken from recognized sources, but to the arguments with which the tribunal analyzes the recognition or disregard of the juridical personality. It considers that this connection between forced disappearance and the violation of Article 3 of the American Convention constitutes a piece of information about the evolution of the international law on human rights and it analyzes the disregard of the juridical personality by reference to the possibility/impossibility of exercising rights. 29. In this aspect, the Judgment of the case of Anzualdo Castro deems that the disappeared individual is placed outside the legal framework, given this situation. He is in a kind of legal uncertainty, a limbo, a vacuum, outside the protection of the law. He is deprived of having access to justice, of the recourses that justice provides to him, as well as the protection (which is true, as we have seen, and it is established in international treaties). 30. The Judgment goes, then, on the description of situations of fact and the narration of infinite and evident obstacles that are contrary to the exercise of the victim's rights. At some moment, it indicates, though it does not insist, that it is denied to the individual the capacity of being entitled to rights, it is eliminated or cancelled by an act attributable to the State. However, the main argument points to the impossibility of exercise rights. This does not derive from a disregard de jure, but from a disturbance de facto.