38 constitutional guarantees, domestic political unrest or other public calamities or emergencies.70 118. The right to physical, mental and moral integrity of all persons and the obligation of the State to treat the individuals deprived of their freedom with respect for the inherent dignity of the human person entails the reasonable prevention of situations that may impair protected rights. 119. In this regard, the Court has established that a person that has been illegally detained is in a state of greater vulnerability, and therefore exposed to the potential risk that other rights are violated as well, such as the right to humane treatment and to be treated with respect for their dignity.71 In addition, it has been acknowledged that threats and real danger of physical harm causes, in certain circumstances, such a degree of moral anguish that it may be considered psychological torture.72 120. The Court has established that the State, in light of its role as guarantor of the rights enshrined in the Convention, is responsible for the observance of the right to humane treatment of all individuals in its custody.73 As a result, there is a presumption of liability against the State for the torture, cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment that an individual in the custody of State officials may exhibit, if the authorities have failed to conduct a rigorous investigation into the facts followed by the indictment of those identified as the perpetrators of such acts.74 In such cases, the burden of responsibility is placed on the State to provide a satisfactory and convincing explanation of the events and disprove the allegations against it through adequate proffer of evidence.75 121. It must now be determined if during his arrest and before his death any violation of Article 5 of the Convention was committed to the detriment of Mr. Bernabé Baldeón-García. 122. It has been proven before this Court that Mr. Bernabé Baldeón-García was arrested by soldiers without a warrant issued by a judge having jurisdiction to do so and under circumstances that do not qualify as flagrancy (supra paras. 58 and 76(17)). 70 Cf. Case of García-Asto and Ramírez-Rojas, supra note 10, para. 222; Case of Caesar, supra note 3, para. 59; and Case of Lori Berenson-Mejía. Judgment of November 25, 2004. Series C No. 119, para. 100. 71 Cf. Case of López-Álvarez, supra note 6, para. 104; Case of Tibi. Judgment of September 7, 2004. Series C No. 114, para. 147; and Case of the Gómez-Paquiyauri brothers, supra note 44, para. 108. 72 Cf. Case of Tibi, supra note 71, para. 147; and Case of Maritza Urrutia. Judgment of November 27, 2003. Series C No. 103, para. 92; and Case of Cantoral-Benavides. Judgment of August 18, 2000. Series C No. 69, para. 102. 73 Cf. Case of López-Álvarez, supra note 6, paras. 104 to 106. 74 Cf. Case of the “Street Children” (Villagrán-Morales et al.), supra para. 47, para. 170. In the same regard, cf. Eur.C.H.R., Aksoy v. Turkey, Judgment of December 18, 1996, para. 61; and Eur.C.H.R., Tomasi v. France of August 27, 1992, Series A No. 241, paras. 108-111. 75 Cf. Case of Juan Humberto Sánchez, supra note 53, para. 111.