96. In the instance case, it is undisputed that Mr. José Delfín Acosta died while in State custody. Nor is it disputed that forensic studies pointed to impairment of the victim's physical integrity prior to his death. The dispute regarding the State's responsibility for those injuries and his death revolves around the petitioners' claim that death was produced by blows struck by police officers, while the State indicates that it was produced by the victim's degree of intoxication and blows inflicted by the victim himself while in that state. 97. Given that disagreement and by the standards cited above, since they occurred while in its custody, the State must be presumed to be responsible for both the injuries and the death. That presumption could only be proved unfounded if the State itself provides a satisfactory explanation. Here, the Commission observes, as will be analyzed below, that the criminal investigations did not throw definitive judicial light on what happened. 98. Moreover, as regards the explanation that Mr. José Delfín Acosta's degree of drunkenness and intoxication at the time of his detention was such as to endanger his life, such an explanation is incompatible with the police officers' decision to take him not to a health center but rather to the police station. Nothing in the file indicates any form of assistance given to Mr. Acosta by those police officers that might lend plausibility to the version offered by the State so as to render the presumption of its responsibility unfounded. Were the hypothesis of death through intoxication to be accepted, then the police officers in Police Station No. 5 should have ordered him taken to the nearest hospital as soon as he arrived at the situation, instead of waiting for his condition to worsen. Those officers declared that Mr. Acosta was so intoxicated that he began to inflict blows on himself and it was necessary to handcuff him to prevent him from doing harm to himself. Thus, even in that hypothesis, the State would have failed in its duty to guarantee the right to life and humane treatment of Mr. Acosta by taking appropriate action. 99. In addition to the State's failure to produce a satisfactory explanation in the terms analyzed, there is also circumstantial evidence pointing to the improbability of the State's version. Thus, it is relevant to point out that none of the people who witnessed the detention talked of having seen Mr. Acosta is such a poor state as that described by the guards. It is striking therefore that from a state in which he "stumbled" or "spoke incoherently", Mr. Acosta went to one of extreme violence. The Commission notes that, at the very least, there were reasonable doubts that were not satisfactorily resolved by internal proceedings about the blows not being self-inflicted, bearing in mind, furthermore, by expert Nandin's observation that the area of the blow "is accessible to third parties" and that the marks left were not consistent with self-inflicted blows. 100. In light of the above, the Commission concludes that the State did not manage to prove unfounded the presumption of the State's responsibility for the death of José Delfín Acosta while he was in its custody by means of an explanation that could be deemed satisfactory. What is more, even in the hypothesis adduced by the State, the IACHR considers that its authorities did not lend the immediate assistance that would have been required by a person in the state and level of intoxication described by the State at the time of his detention -- a detention already characterized by the Commission as arbitrary -- nor did the State act in such a way as to safeguard his physical integrity and life while he was in its custody. 101. Consequently, the Commission concludes that the Argentine State violated the rights to life and human treatment/personal liberty recognized at Articles 4.1, 5.1, and 5.2 of the American Convention, in conjunction with the obligations to observe and ensure rights set forth in Article 1(1) of said instrument, to the detriment of José Delfín Acosta Martínez.