could lead to the presumption that an offense of rape, as defined in April 1992, had possibly been committed.” It indicated that, in any case, rape was an offense subject to private right of action at that time, so that the investigation could not be opened ex officio. 347. With regard to both justifications, the Court clarifies that the Inter-American Convention against Torture establishes two situations that give rise to the State’s obligation to investigate: on the one hand, when a complaint is filed and, on the other, when there is a well-founded reason to believe that an act of torture has been committed within the sphere of the State’s jurisdiction. 495 In these situation, the decision to open and conduct an investigation is not a discretionary power of the State, but constitutes a peremptory State obligation derived from international law and cannot be ignored or conditioned by domestic legal provisions or decisions of any kind. 496 In addition, as this Court has already indicated, even when the acts of torture or cruel inhuman or degrading treatment have not been denounced before the competent authorities, in any case in which there are indications that these have occurred, the State must open, ex officio and immediately, an impartial, independent and thorough investigation that permits a determination of the nature and origin of the injuries found, and the identification and prosecution of those responsible. 497 In the instant case, the Court considers that the statements made by Ms. J. in 1992 were clear in indicating that, at the time of the initial arrest, a gun was pointed at her, and she was blindfolded, and subjected to sexual touching, among other acts (supra paras. 322 to 326). In particular, regarding the expression “sexual touching,” this Court disagrees with the State’s observation that an act of sexual assault cannot be inferred from this expression. It is essential to take into account that victims of sexual abuse tend to use fairly unspecific terms when making their statements and not to explain graphically the anatomical particularities of what happened. 498 In this regard, the CVR indicated that “[i]t is usual that the deponents use ambiguous tor ‘personal’ expressions when describing the acts of sexual abuse to which they were subjected,” 499 and referred specifically to the use of the expression “inappropriate touching” as one of the ways in which the victims described acts of sexual abuse (supra paras. 316 and 317). 348. Regarding the inexistence of the international obligation to investigate sexual “touching” at the time of the events, the Court reiterates its consistent case law 500 concerning the obligation to investigate possible acts of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment. The Court also points out that, prior to the events of this case and at the time they were being investigated, Peru already had the obligation to investigate acts of violence against women, including sexual violence, and other international bodies, such as the United Nations Committee for the Elimination of Discrimination against Women and the Economic and Social Council had already ruled on this obligation. 501 In this regard, it should be indicated that, although the case law of this Court has 495 Cf. Case of Vélez Loor v. Panama, supra, para. 240, and Case of Gudiel Álvarez et al. (“Diario Militar”) v. Guatemala, supra, para. 278. 496 Cf. Case of the Miguel Castro Castro Prison v. Peru. Merits, reparations and costs, supra, para. 347, and Case of Vélez Loor v. Panama, supra, para. 240. 497 Cf. Case of Gutiérrez Soler v. Colombia, supra, para. 54, and Case of García Lucero et al. v. Chile, supra, para. 124. 498 Similarly, see International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, The Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, Judgment of 2 September 1998, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, para. 687. 499 Report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, volume VI, chapter 1.5, p. 364. 500 See, for example, Case of Velásquez Rodríguez v. Honduras. Merits, supra, para. 172; Case of the “Street Children” (Villagrán Morales et al.) v. Guatemala. Merits, supra, paras. 250 to 252; Case of Bámaca Velásquez v. Guatemala. Merits, supra, para. 120; Case of Cabrera García and Montiel Flores v. Mexico, supra, para. 135; Case of the Massacres of El Mozote and nearby places v. El Salvador, supra, para. 243; Case of Gudiel Álvarez et al. (“Diario Militar”) v. Guatemala, supra, para. 274, and Case of Mendoza et al. v. Argentina, supra, para. 234. 501 Article 2 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, in force since September 3, 1981, and ratified by Peru on September 13, 1982, establishes that: “States Parties condemn discrimination against women in all its forms, agree to pursue by all appropriate means and without delay a policy of eliminating discrimination against women and, to this end, undertake: […] (b) To adopt appropriate legislative and other measures, including sanctions where appropriate, prohibiting all discrimination against women; (c) To establish legal protection of the rights of 103