treatment alleged, and disproves the arguments concerning its responsibility, with adequate probative elements (supra para. 343). C.2.6) Determination of the ill-treatment that occurred 354. Based on all the preceding considerations, the Court finds that it has been proved sufficiently that, at the time of the initial arrest, Ms. J. was blindfolded, beaten, and subjected to sexual touching, and that after leaving the building on Las Esmeraldas Street she was not taken directly to the DINCOTE but was in a vehicle for an indeterminate time, possibly while other buildings were searched. This determination is based on: (1) the context at the time of the events and the similarity of this with the facts related by Ms. J.; (2) the statements by Ms. J. before the domestic authorities; (3) the inconsistencies in the testimony of the prosecutor of the Public Prosecution Service; (4) the medical examination performed on Ms. J., and (5) the State’s failure to clarify the facts. The Court also recalls that Ms. J.’s arrest was made without a court order and she was not brought before a court for at least 15 days (supra paras. 137 to 144). The conditions in which the arrest was carried out support the conclusion that the ill-treatment alleged by J. occurred. 355. The Court notes that the Commission and the representative also argue that, during the transfers, State official threatened Ms. J. several times, indicating that they were going “‘to drive to the beach,’ a phrase that was widely known in Peru as a threat of torture or assassination” (supra paras. 308 and 309). This argument has not been explicitly confirmed or refuted by the evidence in the case file. In particular, this Court underscores that, in her statements at the domestic level, Ms. J. made no mention of this. However, the Court indicated above that the date and time that the search of the building on Las Esmeraldas Street ended is unclear, and that Ms. J.’s detention was not recorded by the DINCOTE until 11.55 a.m. on April 15, 1992 (supra paras. 92, 338 and 339). According to the prosecutor of the Public Prosecution Service, before being taken to the DINCOTE Ms. J. was driven to her home in order to search it. 510 It is unclear where else Ms. J. was driven between her arrest and her entry into the DINCOTE. These facts accord credibility to Ms. J.’s statement that, after leaving the building on Las Esmeraldas Street, they had been driving around until she was taken to the DINCOTE. Furthermore, according to the CVR, “[i]t was common that women were threatened with being taken to the beach, [which] implied that they were going to be raped.” 511 In summary, there is no evidence in the case file that disproves the truth of these allegations and of the statements made by Ms. J. at the domestic level; while these coincide with the context at the time of the facts, as well as with the other facts of the case. Consequently, the Court finds it reasonable to presume that during the said transfers, Ms. J. continued to be threatened by the police officials who had arrested her. 356. For the purposes of this Judgment, the indications that arise from the body of evidence are sufficient to reach the conclusion that Ms. J. suffered different types of ill-treatment at the time of her initial arrest. In this regard, as it has on other occasions, 512 this Court observes that reaching another conclusion, would mean allowing the State to shield itself behind the negligence and ineffectiveness of the investigation and the situation of impunity in which the facts of the case remain, in order to extract itself from its responsibility. C.2.7) Legal characterization of the facts 357. In the instant case, two disputes exist in relation to the characterization of the ill-treatment verified above. On the one hand, the parties and the Commission differ as to whether what the 510 Cf. Statement made by Magda Victoria Atto Mendives during the public hearing held in this case. 511 Report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, volume VI, chapter 1.5, pp. 324 and 325. 512 Cf. Case of Kawas Fernández v. Honduras. Merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of April 3, 2009. Series C No. 196, para. 97, and Case of Rosendo Cantú et al. v. Mexico, supra, para. 104. 106