medical examination does not contradict Ms. J.’s version of events, and (7) the State has not opened an investigation into these facts. The Court considers that this act entailed the physical invasion of Ms. J.’s body and, since the presumed victim’s genital area was affected, this meant that it was of a sexual nature. In addition, the circumstances in which the acts occurred eliminate any possibility that there was consent. Therefore, the Court considers that the “inappropriate touching” of which Ms. J. was a victim constituted an act of sexual violence. Although victims of sexual violence tend to use unspecific terms when making their statements and not to explain graphically the anatomical particularities of what happened (supra para. 347), this Court considers that, based on the statements of the presumed victim in the file of this case, it is not possible to determine whether the said sexual violence also constituted rape as described above (supra para. 359). 361. The Court considers that the sexual violence perpetrated by a State agent of which Ms. J. was a victim and while she was being arrested is a serious and reprehensible act, taking into account the vulnerability of the victim and the abuse of power deployed by the agent. Regarding Article 5 of the Convention, the Court considers that the said act was both physically and emotionally degrading and humiliating, so that it could have had severe psychological consequences for the presumed victim. 362. Furthermore, this Court has indicated that the violation of an individual’s right to physical and mental integrity has different levels that range from torture to other types of humiliations or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, the physical and mental aftereffects of which vary in intensity according to factors that are endogenous and exogenous to the individual (such as duration of the violation, age, sex, context and vulnerability) that must be analyzed in each specific situation. 517 In other words, the personal characteristics of a supposed victim of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment must be taken into account when determining whether their personal integrity was violated, because these characteristics may change an individual’s perception of the reality and, consequently, increase the suffering and feeling of humiliation when subjected to certain acts. 518 363. The Court has indicated that any use of force that is not strictly necessary due to the conduct of the person detained constitutes an attack on human dignity, in violation of Article 5 of the American Convention. 519 In the instant case, the State has not proved that the force used at the time of the arrest was necessary (supra paras. 330 and 331). In addition, the sexual violence of which Ms. J. was a victim also constitutes a violation of her right to personal integrity. 364. To define what should be understood as “torture” in light of Article 5(2) of the American Convention, according to the Court’s case law, an act that constitutes torture occurs when the illtreatment: (a) is intentional; (b) causes severe physical or mental suffering, and (c) is committed for an objective or purpose. 520 It has also been recognized that, under certain circumstances, threats and the real danger of a person being subjected to physical injuries produces such a degree of moral anguish that it can be considered psychological torture. 521 365. The Court recalls that, at the time of Ms. J.’s initial arrest, she was blindfolded, hit and subjected to sexual touching and, after leaving the building on Las Esmeraldas Street, she was not 517 Cf. Case of Loayza Tamayo v. Peru. Merits, supra, paras. 57 and 58, and Case of Mendoza et al. v. Argentina, supra, para. 201. 518 Cf. Case of Ximenes Lopes v. Brazil, supra, para. 127, and Case of Mendoza et al. v. Argentina, supra, para. 201. 519 Cf. Case of Loayza Tamayo v. Peru. Merits, supra, para. 57, and Case of the Barrios Family v. Venezuela, supra, para. 52. 520 Cf. Case of Bueno Alves v. Argentina, supra, para. 79, and Case of Mendoza et al. v. Argentina, supra, para. 200. 521 Cf. Case of Cantoral Benavides v. Peru. Merits, supra, para. 102; Case of Maritza Urrutia v. Guatemala, supra, para. 92; Case of Tibi v. Ecuador, supra, para. 147, and Case of Baldeón García v. Peru, supra, para. 119. 108