has clarified that recusal is a procedural instrument that protects the right to be tried by an impartial organ. 291 Similarly, the Court has determined that the guarantees of Independence and impartiality extend to other non-judicial organs responsible for the investigation prior to the judicial proceedings. 292 183. In this case, the Court notes that both the prosecutor who brought the charges in 1993, and also the judges of the Lima Higher Court of Justice and of the Supreme Court of Justice who intervened in this case in 1993 were identified by a numerical code, so that Ms. J. and her lawyer were unaware of their identity (supra paras. 101 to 105). This Court also notes that Decree 25,475, which provided the procedural framework for these proceedings as of May 1992, prohibited the recusal of judges and prosecutors. 293 184. According to the reiterated case law of this Court in cases involving Peru, trials before “faceless” or “secret” judges violate Article 8(1) of the American Convention, because they prevent the accused from knowing the identity of the judges and, consequently, from assessing their aptness and competence, as well as from determining if there are reasons to recuse them, so that they can exercise their defense before an independent and impartial court. 294 Furthermore, the Court reiterates that this situation was aggravated by the legal impossibility of recusing the said judges. 295 The Court also recalls that this obligation extends to other non-judicial officials who intervene in the proceedings, so that the intervention of the “faceless” prosecutor in the criminal 296 proceeding against Ms. J. also constitutes a violation of Article 8(1) of the Convention. 185. Regarding the State’s argument that trials by “faceless” judges did not constitute a violation of the natural judge, the Court notes that trial by judges whose identity is not known does not allow the accused to question their competence, legality, independence and impartiality. The Peruvian Constitutional Court ruled similarly when declaring the unconstitutionality of article 13(h) of DecreeLaw 25,475: 112. […] as is logical, it is not sufficient that the right to a natural judge is reflected in the constitutional texts, but it is necessary to establish those mechanisms that provide the justiciables with the means to put the use of the right into practice. The mechanism of recusal is designed specifically to question the impartiality and independence of the judge in deciding the case. Even when the Constitution expressly recognizes the right to a natural judge, if the possibility of recusing the judges of the proceedings is restricted unreasonably, it becomes impossible to exercise the right in the practice. 113. Hence, paragraph (h) of Article 13 of Decree-Law No. 25,475, by prohibiting absolutely the possibility of recusing the judges and court officials who intervene in the case, incurs in a disproportionate and unreasonable restriction of the right to a natural judge and is also unconstitutional. 297 Merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of February 24, 2012. Series C No. 239, para. 189. 291 Cf. Case of Apitz Barbera et al. (“First Contentious Administrative Court”) v. Venezuela, supra, para. 64. 292 Cf. Case of Cantoral Huamaní and García Santa Cruz v. Peru, supra, para. 133. 293 Article 13(h) of this decree also established that “[i]n the processing of proceedings for terrorism, the recusal of the intervening judges or the court officials shall be inadmissible” (supra para. 71) 294 Cf. Case of Castillo Petruzzi et al. v. Peru. Merits, reparations and costs, supra, paras. 133 and 134; Case of Cantoral Benavides v. Peru. Merits, supra, para. 127 and 128; Case of De la Cruz Flores v. Peru, supra, para. 114; Case of Lori Berenson Mejía v. Peru. Merits, reparations and costs, supra, para. 147, and Case of García Asto and Ramírez Rojas v. Peru, supra, para. 149. 295 Cf. Case of Castillo Petruzzi et al. v. Peru. Merits, reparations and costs, supra, paras. 133 and 134, and Case of Lori Berenson Mejía v. Peru. Merits, reparations and costs, supra, para. 147. 296 Cf. Case of Cantoral Huamaní and García Santa Cruz v. Peru, supra, para. 133. 297 Judgment of the Constitutional Court of January 3, 2003, File No. 010-2002-AI/TCLIMA (merits report, folios 1563 and 1564). The expert proposed by the State, José María Ascencio Mellao, was of a similar opinion, when he indicated that a “faceless” court does not guarantee the right to a natural judge, insofar as “the composition of each court or tribunal is not known.” Affidavit prepared by the expert witness José María Asencio Mellado on May 6, 2013 (merits report, folio 1099). 57