a democratic society. 333 As a result, the decisions adopted by the domestic organs of the States that may have an impact on human rights must be reasoned; otherwise, they would be arbitrary decisions. 334 The reasoning of a ruling should reveal the facts, grounds and norms on which the organ that issues it based itself in order to take its decision, so that any sign of arbitrariness can be excluded, while it reveals to the parties that they have been heard during the proceedings. 335 In addition, it should show that the arguments of the parties have been duly taken into account and that all the evidence has been analyzed. 336 Based on the foregoing, the Court has concluded that the obligation to provide the reasoning is one of the “due guarantees” of due process included in Article 8(1). 337 225. In the instant case, after Ms. J. had been acquitted by the Lima Higher Court of Justice on June 18, 1993, the “faceless” Supreme Court of Justice declared that the judgment of December 27, 1993, acquitting her was null and void, and ordered that “a new oral hearing be held by another Special Criminal Chamber” (supra paras. 102 and 105). The said decision merely states: Considerations: pursuant to the report of the prosecutor and considering, also, that the judgment that is being appealed does not make a proper evaluation of the facts that are the subject of the indictment and does not assess the evidence provided adequately in order to establish the innocence or guilt of those accused; that, on the other hand, with regard to the accused who have been convicted, it has not be determined specifically for each of them the pertinent article of the law applicable to their case, so that […] the judgment appealed was declared null and void […]; and it was ordered that a new oral hearing be held by another Special Criminal Chamber […]. 338 226. The Court notes that the said judgment of December 1993 contains no other factual or legal elements that provide information on the reasons for the ruling. In this regard, the Court notes that Ms. J. was indicted in proceedings where she was charged together with another 93 persons (supra para. 101). The judgment of the Lima Higher Court of Justice of June 18, 1993, which acquitted Ms. J., convicted 11 of the accused, acquitted 17, and held in reserve the proceedings against another 65 persons (supra para. 102). However, the ruling that declared this judgment null and void in December that year, did not specify with regard to whom the evidence had been assessed improperly or an undue evaluation had been made of the facts that were the subject of the indictment; it did not establish the legal basis based on which the nullity was declared or the reason why it was in order. 339 This absence of reasoning and grounds in the judgment of the Supreme Court meant that it was impossible for Ms. J. to defend herself adequately so as to be able to contest it or appeal against it in order to enforce the acquittal delivered in her favor. 333 Cf. Case of Apitz Barbera et al. (“First Contentious Administrative Court”) v. Venezuela, supra, para. 77, and Case of Chocrón Chocrón v. Venezuela. Preliminary objection, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of July 1, 2011. Series C No. 227, para. 118. 334 Cf. Case of Yatama v. Nicaragua. Preliminary objections, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of June 23, 2005. Series C No. 127, para. 125, and Case of Chocrón Chocrón v. Venezuela, supra, para. 118. 335 Cf. Case of Claude Reyes et al. v. Chile, supra, para. 122; Case of Apitz Barbera et al. (“First Contentious Administrative Court”) v. Venezuela, supra, para. 78, and Case of Chocrón Chocrón v. Venezuela, supra, para. 118. 336 Cf. Case of López Mendoza v. Venezuela, supra, para. 141. 337 Cf. Case of Apitz Barbera et al. (“First Contentious Administrative Court”) v. Venezuela, supra, para. 78, and Case of López Mendoza v. Venezuela, supra, para. 141. 338 Judgment of the Supreme Court of Justice of December 27, 1993 (file of annexes to the answering brief, annex 50, folio 3789). 339 The appeal for annulment is regulated in articles 292 to 301 of the Code of Criminal Procedures. In particular, article 292 establishes that: “[t]he appeal for annulment is in order against: (a) the judgments in ordinary proceedings; (b) the rulings issued by the Higher Criminal Court in the ordinary proceedings that, in first instance, revoke the conditional conviction, the reserved status of the conviction, and the penalty of a fine or community service or daytime confinement; (c) the final decisions delivered by the Higher Criminal Court that, in first instance, extinguish the action or terminate the proceeding or the instance; (d) the decisions issued by the Higher Criminal Court that, in first instance, rule on the merging of punishments, or the substitution of the punishment by retroactivity to the more favorable penalty, or that limit the fundamental right to personal liberty, and (e) the decisions expressly established by law. 1941 Code of Criminal Procedures, article 292 (file of annexes to the State’s brief of August 14, 2013, folios 5153 to 5154). 67