This acquittal was annulled in December 1993 by the ���faceless” Supreme Court of Justice, which ordered that a new trial be held. Owing to the absence of Ms. J., these proceedings remained at the same stage until May 2003, when, in application of Legislative Decree No. 926, the National Counter-terrorism Chamber declared “all the proceedings up until that time null and void” with regard to Ms. J. As a result of this annulment, in September 2005, the Public Prosecution Service filed new charges against her for the offenses of “terrorism” and “apology of terrorism,” even when it defined them by law as conducts “established and penalized under articles 316 and 322 of the 1991 Criminal Code.” Lastly, in January 2006, the National Criminal Chamber declared that there were grounds to try Ms. J. for the offenses of “apology of terrorism” and “terrorism,” following which the proceedings have been held in reserve on numerous occasions, owing to her absence. Currently, this criminal trial remains at the stage of the opening of the oral hearing and Ms. J. has been declared in contempt of court. 262. In order to constitute a violation of Article 8(4) of the American Convention: (i) the accused must have been acquitted; (ii) the acquittal must be the result of a final judgment, and (iii) the new trial must be based on the same facts that were the grounds for the first trial. 386 263. In the instant case, although Ms. J. was acquitted at one time, the Court must determine whether this acquittal was non-appealable, so that it could give rise to a violation of the principle of non bis in idem. According to the representative, various defects in the 1993 judgment of the “faceless” Supreme Court of Justice result in this decision lacking legal effects, so that the acquittal delivered in favor of Ms. J. had become final and the proceedings currently open against her would violate the non bis in idem principle. 264. This Court takes note that the criminal proceedings against Ms. J. were specifically declared null and void during the first stage of the proceedings (up until 2003) and were then nullified as a result of a legal provision, common to all the trials processed by secret judges and agents of justice. In this regard, the Court notes that the dispute on the violation of the principle of non bis in idem turns on the effects that should be accorded to the specific nullity declared against the judgment acquitting her in 1993. 265. The Court underscores that two expert witnesses who testified on the principle of non bis in idem before this Court indicated that the said acquittal was never final, because it had been annulled by a decision of the Supreme Court in December 1993. In particular, expert witness Eduardo Alcócer Povis stated: The […] principle [of non bis in idem] was not violated because the acquittal judgment of June 18, 1993, was declared null and void by the ruling issued by the Supreme Court on December 27 that year; therefore, it never took effect under our legal system. Furthermore, Legislative Decree No. 926, declared null and void all the trials that had been held before ‘faceless’ judges. To this extent, the new trial is legal; the first decision never acquired the status of res judicata. 387 266. Expert witness José María Ascencio Mellao also indicated that the acquittal was not final owing to the Supreme Court’s judgment of 1993, and the annulment decreed in 2003 as a result of Decree-Law 926, as follows: The acquittal judgment of June 18, 1993, was never final because it was annulled by the Supreme Court. The tangible negative effects of res judicata are only admissible based on final judgments and when the required similarities exist; never from a judgment that was not final. For the violation denounced to be admissible, it would be necessary to admit that the judgment delivered by the Supreme Court in the appeal for annulment was null and void, but not the previous one, and that the said nullity resulted in the final nature of the previous one. But […] there are no arguments that would justify this conclusion. First, because the judgment that was 386 Cf. IACHR, Case No. 11,006. Report No. 1/95, Case of Alan García v. Peru. Annual Report, 1994, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.88 Doc. 9 rev. (1995), February 7, 1995. 387 Affidavit prepared by the expert witness Eduardo Alcócer Povis on May 8, 2013 (merits report, folio 1179) 78