Court has considered that a denial of the occurrence of a sexual attack that has been reported does not necessarily disprove the statements where it was indicated that it had happened, but must be analyzed taking into account the specific circumstances of the case and of the victim. 446 In addition, the legal definition of the acts that the presumed victim used in her statements must be assessed taking into account the usual meaning of the words used, which does not necessarily correspond to their legal definition. The relevant factor is to evaluate whether the acts described, and not the legal definition given to them, were consistent. 325. Ms. J. also mentioned in her accounts that: (i) a gun had been pointed at her; 447 (ii) she had remained lying on the floor with her arms behind her while someone trod on her legs; 448 (iii) she had heard that they were going to make her disappear or take her to a barracks, 449 and (iv) that, when they left the building on Las Esmeraldas Street, they had driven around until 6 a.m. when she was taken to the DINCOTE. 450 The Court notes that the mention of some of the alleged ill-treatment only in some of the statements does not mean that this is false or that the facts reported are not true. 451 In this regard, the Court takes into account that the events described by Ms. J. refer to a traumatic moment she underwent, and its impact could result in a certain lack of precision when recalling them. 452 Moreover, these accounts were mostly given as part of the same preliminary statement made in the criminal proceedings, which was suspended and continued on several occasions. Therefore, it is not reasonable to require that Ms. J. should testify on all the presumed illtreatment of which she had been a victim every time she addressed the State authorities. The Court also notes that these were the only occasions on which a statement was taken from Ms. J. during the criminal proceedings and she was consistent in all her accounts of the events described. In addition, the Court notes that the first statement given by the presumed victim, before her preliminary statement, was given before police officials, while she was detained incommunicado in the DINCOTE. These conditions do not ensure a comfortable and secure environment that provides privacy and trust to give a detailed account of the alleged abuse 453 (infra paras. 328 and 337). Consequently, it is reasonable that Ms. J. did not recount all the presumed ill-treatment on that occasion. 326. It is also necessary to consider that the presumed victim never denied the alleged illtreatment and, when she mentioned it, she did so without it being in response to any specific question asked during her statements. In addition, after describing the alleged ill-treatment, the interrogators continued taking her statement without asking any question as a result of what she had asserted. In sum, the Court considers that, in the different statements made by Ms. J. before the domestic authorities, the main circumstances concur. 446 Cf. Case of Rosendo Cantú et al. v. Mexico, supra, para. 95. Similarly, ECHR, Teslenko v. Ukraine, no. 55528/08, §§ 88, 95 and 96, 20 December 2011, and United Nations. Istanbul Protocol. Manual on the Effective Investigation and Documentation of Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (hereinafter “Istanbul Protocol”), 9 August 1999, para. 99.vii. 447 Cf. Preliminary statement of June 10, 1992, before the Tenth Investigating Court of Lima (file of annexes to the answering brief, annex 41, folio 3698), and preliminary statement of June 15, 1992, before the Tenth Investigating Court of Lima (file of annexes to the answering brief, annex 42, folio 3704). 448 Cf. Preliminary statement of June 19, 1992, before the Tenth Investigating Court of Lima (file of annexes to the State’s brief of June 24, 2013, annex 17, folio 4742). 449 Cf. Preliminary statement of June 10, 1992, before the Tenth Investigating Court of Lima (file of annexes to the answering brief, annex 41, folio 3698). 450 Cf. Preliminary statement of June 10, 1992, before the Tenth Investigating Court of Lima (file of annexes to the answering brief, annex 41, folio 3698). 451 Cf. Case of Cabrera García and Montiel Flores v. Mexico, supra, para. 113. 452 Similarly, see, Case of Fernández Ortega et al. v. Mexico, supra, para. 105, and Case of Rosendo Cantú et al. v. Mexico, supra, para. 91. 453 Cf. Case of Fernández Ortega et al. v. Mexico, supra, para. 194, and Case of Rosendo Cantú et al. v. Mexico, supra, para. 178. 95