interpretive authority for the obligations established in the American Convention, 502 the obligation to investigate and prosecute acts of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment is derived from the obligation to ensure the full exercise of the rights recognized in the Convention contained in Article 1(1) of the American Convention and does not depend solely on what this Court has reaffirmed in its case law. The guarantee that violations of human rights, such as to life and to personal integrity, be investigated is established in the American Convention and does not arise from its application and interpretation by this Court in the exercise of its contentious jurisdiction, so that it must be respected by the States Parties from the moment they ratify this treaty. 503 Therefore, the State’s argument in this regard is not admissible. 349. Regarding the alleged impediments to investigate the facts imposed by domestic law, the Court recalls that it is a basic principle of international law, supported by international jurisprudence, that States must meet their obligations under international conventions in good faith (pacta sunt servanda) and, as the Court has already indicated and as established in Article 27 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, a State may not invoke the provisions of its domestic law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty. 504 Accordingly, the State cannot excuse its failure to comply with the obligation to investigate the facts described because they were not codified at the time of the events. Nevertheless, the Court notes that the laws in force in Peru in 1992 did not establish a definition of the offense of rape that would exclude the possibility of “sexual touching” constituting rape. 505 350. In addition, with regard to the impediment to opening an investigation ex officio because the offense of rape was subject to private right of action, the Court repeats that, when there is a wellfounded reason to believe that an act of torture or ill-treatment has been committed in the sphere of the State’s jurisdiction, the decision to open and conduct an investigation is not a discretionary power, but rather the duty to investigate constitutes a peremptory State obligation that arises from international law and cannot be disregarded or conditioned by domestic legal decisions or provisions women on an equal basis with men and to ensure through competent national tribunals and other public institutions the effective protection of women against any act of discrimination.” In this regard, in 1989, the Committee for the Elimination of Discrimination against Women indicated that: “Considering that articles 2, 5, 11, 12 and 16 of the Convention require the States parties to act to protect women against violence of any kind occurring within the family, at the work place or in any other area of social life, [… r]ecommends to the States parties that they should include in their periodic reports to the Committee information about: 1. The legislation in force to protect women against the incidence of all kinds of violence in everyday life (including sexual violence, abuses in the family, sexual harassment at the work place etc.).” Also, in 1992, the Committee for the Elimination of Discrimination against Women recommended that “States parties should take all legal and other measures that are necessary to provide effective protection of women against gender-based violence, including, inter alia: (i) Effective legal measures, including penal sanctions, civil remedies and compensatory provisions to protect women against all kinds of violence, including inter alia violence and abuse in the family, sexual assault and sexual harassment in the workplace.” Cf. Committee for the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, General Recommendation No. 12, eighth session, 1989, and General Recommendation No. 19, eleventh session, 1992, available at http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/recommendations/recomm.htm. Regarding the Economic and Social Council, see, Resolution 1988/27 Efforts to eradicate violence against women within the family and society, E/RES/1988/90; the Report of the Secretary-General on the efforts to eradicate violence against women within the family and society (1987), E/CN.6/1988/6; Resolution 1990/15 Recommendations and conclusions arising from the first review and appraisal of the implementation of the Nairobi Forward-looking Strategies for the Advancement of Women to the year 2000, E/RES/1990/68, and Resolution 1991/18 Violence against women in all its forms. See also, Report of the World Conference on Women, Nairobi, 15 to 26 June 1985, para. 76, Available at http://www.un.org/womenwatch/confer/nfls/Nairobi1985report.txt 502 Cf. Case of Vélez Restrepo and family members v. Colombia, supra, para. 241. 503 Cf. Case of Vélez Restrepo and family members v. Colombia, supra, para. 241. 504 Cf. International Responsibility for the Promulgation and Enforcement of Laws in Violation of the Convention (Arts. 1 and 2 American Convention on Human Rights), Advisory Opinion OC-14/94 of December 9, 1994. Series A No. 14, para. 35, and Case of Zambrano Vélez et al. v. Ecuador, supra, para. 104. 505 Article 170 of the 1991 Criminal Code establishes that: “[a]nyone who, by violence or grave threat, obliges a person to carry out a sexual or similar act, shall be punished with imprisonment of no less than three and no more than six years. If the rape is carried out at gunpoint and by two or more individuals, the punishment shall be no less than four or more than twelve years” (file of annexes to the State’s brief of August 14, 2013, folio 5328). 104