taken directly to the DINCOTE, but was in a vehicle for an indeterminate time while, possibly, other buildings were being searched, and during this time she was being threatened (supra paras. 354 to 356). When analyzing these facts, it is necessary to take into account that, since she was blindfolded, Ms. J. must have been disoriented, which probably increased her level of anxiety and terror about what could happen. These feelings increased when Ms. J. was driven for some time without a known destination, when it can be presumed that she was threatened by police agents (supra para. 355), without any type of legal guarantees. In this context, having been arrested by force, and having been the victim of sexual violence, Ms. J. ran a real and immediate risk that these threats would be carried through. This is also supported by the context that existed at the time of the events. 366. Based on all the circumstances of the case, the Court concludes that the ill-treatment to which Ms. J. was subjected at the time of her arrest constituted a violation of Article 5(2), which prohibits subjecting anyone to torture or to cruel, inhuman, or degrading punishment or treatment. 367. Furthermore, the Court has stipulated that although Article 11 of the American Convention is entitled “Protection of honor and dignity” [Translator’s note: in the Spanish version; but “Right to Privacy” in the English translation], its content includes the protection of privacy. 522 Sexual life is one of the spheres protected by the concept of privacy. 523 The Court considers that the sexual violence of which Ms. J. was a victim supposed interference in the most personal and intimate aspects of her private life. 368. Based on the above, the Court concludes that the State is responsible for the violation of the rights to personal integrity, dignity and privacy, established, respectively, in Articles 5(1), 5(2), 11(1) and 11(2) of the American Convention, in relation to Articles 1(1) of this instrument and 6 of the Inter-American Convention against Torture. In addition, the Court notes that the State has not investigated the acts that violated Articles 5 and 11 of the American Convention (supra paras. 341 to 353), which signifies failure to comply with the obligation to ensure personal integrity and also the protection of privacy, as well as the obligation established in Article 7(b) of the Convention of Belém do Pará and Articles 6 and 8 of the Inter-American Convention against Torture, to the detriment of Ms. J. Consequently, the Court does not find it necessary to make an additional ruling, regarding the alleged violation of Articles 8 and 25 of the American Convention, to the detriment of J., based on these same facts. D) Alleged ill-treatment suffered during the detention in the DINCOTE D.1) Arguments of the Commission and of the parties 369. The Commission concluded that, ��[o]n arriving at the DINCOTE, [Ms. J.] was obliged to sit on the cement floor and was not allowed to move or to speak, [and w]hen she asked to use the bathroom, the police responded negatively, so that she was obliged to urinate in a can in the presence of two male police agents.” It indicated that “[s]he was not given any food or water from 6 a.m. to 8 p.m. on April 14, 1992”; “[s]he was hit on the face, obliged to remain standing facing the wall for the rest of the night, and heard the cries of other detainees who were being beaten.” In addition, [s]he was taken to a cell that had a latrine without a door and the floor covered in cockroaches.” Also, according to the Commission, Ms. J. “was coerced ‘to collaborate’ because, to the contrary, her sister, who was detained in the same place, would be made to suffer more”; she was “threatened with torture using ‘the tub of water’ and electric shocks,” and with “being 522 Cf. Case of the Ituango Massacres v. Colombia, supra, para. 193, and Case of the Massacres of El Mozote and nearby places v. El Salvador, supra, para. 166. 523 Cf. Case of Fernández Ortega et al. v. Mexico, supra, para. 129, and Case of Gudiel Álvarez et al. (“Diario Militar”) v. Guatemala, supra, para. 276. 109