275. According to the representative, the presumed victim was tried: (i) “under substantive criminal legislation that was enacted following her detention”; (ii) without defining which criminal conduct [or specific acts] she was accused of”; (iii) “without at any time individualizing her specific responsibility in the different acts relating to the proceedings opened against around 23 persons,” and (iv) that when “prosecuting her, Decree-Law 25,475 was applied, which was promulgated after her detention.” Likewise, the representative established that “the September 29, 2005, indictment of J. and the criminal proceedings currently open against J. violate the principle of legality because they are based on an alleged offense of ‘apology of terrorism’ that is not in accordance with the definition of the said offense in the law,” and, furthermore, the said offense had become subject to the statute of limitations. 276. Meanwhile, the State argued that “the illegal conducts attributed to Ms. J. can be identified clearly at the main procedural stages.” According to the State, “the reference to the different offenses is due in part to the legislative reforms made in order to adapt the counter-terrorism laws to international standards”; hence, “[a]t each stage the offenses were identified under the laws in force at the time.” The State also indicated that “the supposed indistinct use of different offenses was due only and exclusively to an issue of their nomenclature, but not to an alleged lack of clarity about the acts and their correspondence to the offenses.” Peru argued that “Ms. J. was not prosecuted for acts or omissions that, when they were committed, were not offenses under the applicable law.” According to the State “[t]he application of Decree-Law No. 25,475 […] has been amended by the Judiciary itself […, so that] there has been no violation of the principle of legality in the criminal proceedings opened against Ms. J.” In addition, the State clarified that, based on the principle of tempus regit actum, the procedural norms contained in Legislative Decrees 922 to 926 are applicable to the new criminal proceedings against Ms. J. “and therefore, […] Article 9 of the American Convention was not violated either, since these norms are merely adjectival law.” B.3.2) Considerations of the Court 277. Based on the arguments of the Commission and the representative, the Court notes that, in the instant case, it is alleged that there has been a violation of the “right of defense and the principle of legality, considered in conjunction” owing to: (i) the alleged retroactive application of Decree-Law 25,475, and (ii) the alleged indeterminacy of the conducts of which the presumed victim is accused, as well as their legal basis. In addition, the representative has argued a violation of the principle of legality owing to (iii) the alleged basing of the new criminal proceedings on illegal evidence and the alleged prescription of the offense of apology of terrorism of which Ms. J. is accused. i. The alleged retroactive application of Decree-Law 25,475 278. The principle of legality constitutes one of the key elements of criminal prosecution in a democratic society by establishing that “no one shall be convicted of any act or omission that did not constitute a criminal offense, under the applicable law, at the time it was committed.” This principle regulates the actions of all the organs of the State in their respective jurisdictions, particularly when punitive powers must be exercised. 401 In a democratic State, under the rule of law, every care must be taken to ensure that criminal punishments are adopted with strict respect for the basic rights of the individual and following a careful verification of the effective existence of the wrongful conduct.402 401 Cf. Case of Baena Ricardo et al. v. Panama. Merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of February 2, 2001. Series C No. 72, para. 107, and Case of Mohamed v. Argentina, supra, para. 130. 402 Cf. Case of Baena Ricardo et al. v. Panama. Merits, reparations and costs, supra, para. 106, and Case of Mohamed v. Argentina, supra, para. 130. 82