proportionality were respected.” Despite this, the State indicated that “Ms. J. was detained because she was in flagrante delicto, committing acts related to the crime of terrorism.” In this regard, the State argued that “when she was arrested, objects, documents and other evidence was seized that linked her to the ‘Shining Path’ terrorist group.” It also indicated that the crime of terrorism “is understood by criminal doctrine as a permanent offense.” It also indicated that “the search records […] reveal the presence of officials of the Public Prosecution Service as a guarantee of constitutional rights, during the measures taken in this case.” In addition, the State asserted that the arrest was not arbitrary because “the force used by the members of the National Police was necessary, reasonable and proportionate, since they were dealing with individuals committing acts of terrorism who tried to escape the police operation.” It also indicated that “[t]he petitioner was arrested on the evening of April 13, 1992, and brought before a judge on April 28, 1992 […], as authorized by the Constitution in force at that time, and also the state of emergency.” Regarding what happened between April 28 and 30, 1992, it indicated that “when someone is brought before the courts, they are kept in what are known as the court cells (carceleras”) […], which are under the judicial authorities and, then, the prison to which the detainee will be taken is decided.” The State indicated that, owing to the existing state of emergency, “the obligation […] to bring J. before the judicial authorities immediately was not in effect at the time of her detention.” 136. Peru also argued that, at the time of the searches, “the right to the inviolability of the home was suspended,” “so that it was possible to enter a home without [the existence of a court order or a situation of flagrante delicto], provided that the principles of reasonableness and proportionality were respected.” Lastly, “[r]egarding the fact that the persons arrested did not sign the police record,” it argued that “this was common practice by those arrested for terrorism and in flagrante delicto, and it is their right, while the State cannot take any coercive measure to oblige someone to sign a police record.” A.1.2) Considerations of the Court 137. The Court has noted that, at the time of Ms. J.’s arrest, a decree was in force that suspended guarantees (supra paras. 61 and 132). The Court has established that the suspension of guarantees constitutes an exceptional situation, under which it is licit for the Government to apply certain measures that restrict rights and freedoms that, under normal conditions, are prohibited or subject to stricter requirements. Nevertheless, this does not mean that the suspension of guarantees entails the temporary suspension of the rule of law or that it authorizes the Government to deviate from the legal conduct that it should always observe. When guarantees are suspended, some of the legal restrictions to the actions of the public powers may differ from those in force under normal conditions, but these restrictions should not be considered to be inexistent and, consequently, it should not be understood that the Government is invested with absolute powers that exceed the 232 conditions under which this exceptional legality is authorized. 138. The Convention permits the suspension of guarantees only in case of war, public emergency 233 In this or other emergency that threatens the independence or security of the State Party. regard, the Court understands that the facts of this case took place in the context of a conflict between armed groups and members of the police and military forces (supra para. 57). Moreover, the representative and the Commission have not argued that, at the time of the facts of this case, the situation in Peru did not require the suspension of the said rights. 232 Cf. Habeas Corpus in Emergency Situations (Arts. 27(2), 25.1 and 7.6 American Convention on Human Rights). Advisory Opinion OC-8/87 of January 30, 1987. Series A No. 8, para. 24. 233 Cf. Habeas Corpus in Emergency Situations (Arts. 27(2), 25.1 and 7.6 American Convention on Human Rights), supra, para. 19, and Case of Zambrano Vélez et al. v. Ecuador, supra, para. 43. 44