285. First, the Court emphasizes that neither the Commission nor the representative have argued or presented any evidence that the definition of the offenses attributed to Ms. J. violate the principle of legality. Therefore, in the instant case, this Court does not deem it pertinent to rule on the State’s arguments in this regard. 406 286. Second, the Commission and the representative argue that, throughout the proceedings against Ms. J. (during both the first and second stages), the conduct attributed to her or of which she is accused has never been clearly defined, and that in different State documents relating to the criminal proceedings reference is made indistinctly to different offenses, each of which has a different content and punishment; and this has therefore signified a violation of Ms. J.’s right to defend herself and of the principle of legality. 287. Regarding the principle of legality, the Court has indicated that, when drafting the definition of offenses, it is necessary to use strict, unequivocal terms that clearly delimit the illegal conducts, giving full meaning to the principle of criminal legality. This involves a clear definition of the incriminated conduct that establishes its elements and permits it to be delimited from conducts that are not illegal or from illegal conducts punished by non-penal measures. Any ambiguity in the wording of the definition of offenses gives rise to doubts and opens the way to the discretion of the authorities, which is particularly undesirable when establishing the criminal responsibility of individuals and sanctioning them with punishments that severely affect fundamental rights, such as life or liberty. 407 288. Regarding the right to defend oneself, this Court reiterates that, in order to ensure this right, the State must inform the interested party not only of the cause of the accusation; that is, the acts or omissions that are attributed to him, but also the reasons that led the State to bring the charge, the evidence for this, and the legal definition of the acts. All this information must be explicit, clear, complete and sufficiently detailed to permit the accused to exercise his right to defend himself fully and to demonstrate his version of the facts to the judge. The Court has considered that the strict observance of Article 8(2)(b) is essential for the effective exercise of the right to defend oneself (supra para. 199) 289. In the instant case, the Court notes that, throughout the proceedings against Ms. J., the presumed victim has been accused of being the author of the offenses of terrorism, aggravated terrorism, membership in a terrorist organization and apology of terrorism, based on different legal provisions. During the first stage of the criminal proceeding against Ms. J., the supposed illegal conduct of the presumed victim was classified as terrorism (article 319) and aggravated terrorism (article 320) and, later, also as membership in a terrorist organization (article 322) (supra paras. 98, 100 and 101). During the second stage of the criminal proceeding against the presumed victim, after several imprecisions had been rectified, the preliminary investigation against Ms. J. was opened for the offenses of apology of terrorism (article 316) and membership in a terrorist organization (article 322), and the charges were later brought on this basis, and it was declared that there were grounds to open the oral hearing (supra paras. 109, 111 and 112). Nevertheless, the Court notes that, during this second stage, some of the decisions and rulings also refer to a 406 In this regard, the State indicated that “neither the Peruvian Constitutional Court nor the Inter-American Court [in other cases against Peru] have considered that the definition of the crime of terrorism, […] or the definition of the offense of belonging to or membership in a terrorist organization are unconstitutional or incompatible with the American Convention.” Peru also argued that “the domestic authorities, in accordance with the judgment of the Constitutional Court of January 3, 2003, have introduced the necessary changes in the norms that regulated the definition of the offenses and other elements that formed the basis for the prosecution of those accused of terrorism.” 407 Cf. Case of Castillo Petruzzi et al. v. Peru. Merits, reparations and costs, supra, para. 121, and Case of Usón Ramírez v. Venezuela, supra, para. 55. 84