the detriment of others. 5 Ensuring the proper protection of the 184 employees depends, therefore, on the simultaneous application of Article 23(1)(c) and of Article 26 since the arbitrarily dismissed were state employees. 5. This dual dimension in the area of the protection of the rights in the Convention cannot, and should not, be a source of confusion. To claim to absorb or subsume, through connectivity, the content of one of the rights within that of the other would denaturalize the content of each right, produce unnecessary overlaps between them and condition the full understanding of the rights in the Convention that should be decided, for example, through a domestic control of conventionality. This distinction is particularly important to create specific standards of protection in the area and, at the same time, to clarify state obligations, enabling the adequate exercise of control of conventionality domestically, which has been made possible by the national authorities within the framework of their respective competences. 6. There are, then, two forms of principle arguments in this opinion: one “hermeneutical” and the other “ontological.” 6 In Section II, we will concentrate on the “hermeneutical,” where we will argue that an integral focus of human rights is not only possible, but also necessary. In Section III, we will concentrate on the “ontological,” specifying the normative content that belongs to the different rights found in Articles 26 and 23(1)(c). In doing so, we wish to reinforce, in support of this judgment, the position that the simultaneous effect of those different rights is indispensable to ensure the full protection of the individual and his or her dignity under the Convention. II. THE GLOBAL AND INTEGRAL DIMENSION OF RIGHTS FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF THE AMERICAN CONVENTION II.1. Conventional hermeneutics and the integrality of human rights 7. To understand human rights globally and integrally, admitting the simultaneous effect of Articles 26 and 23(1)(c) in this specific case, requires that we at least pay attention to the four basic parameters of hermeneutics, which we will explain before specifically dealing with the innovations in the judgment of this case. This hermeneutic is reflected from the moment in which the American Convention was adopted in 1969 since its Preamble expressly establishes that “the ideal of free men […] can be achieved only if conditions are created whereby everyone may enjoy his economic, social, and cultural rights, as well as his civil and political rights.” 6 Separate opinion of Judge A. A. Cançado Trindade in the Pueblo Bello Massacre v. Colombia. Judgment of January 31, 2006. Series C No. 140, para. 14-15: “It is axiomatic that each of the rights protected by the human rights treaties has its own content, from which the different formulations arise […]. Here, we are on an essentially ontological level. […]. The fact that the protected rights are endowed with autonomy and their own material content does not mean that they cannot or should not be interrelated owing to the circumstances of each case. To the contrary, in my opinion this interrelation is the element that provides more effective protection, in light of the indivisibility of all human rights. Here we pass from the ontological to the hermeneutical level.” 5 2

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