civilian was shown in the domestic record, which includes information on his discharge, and that it
is an obligation of the State to safeguard the integrity of persons charged, without sacrificing the
proper jurisdiction and due process in keeping with the law.
The petitioners argue that the alleged victim was forced to pay a bond that was set
and collected illegally and in dollars – to be delivered to the commander of the base, and not at a
state bank – which unleashed a series of violations by state agents. They argue that it was ordered
that the alleged victim be held in preventive detention, he was prohibited from selling his property,
and his bank accounts were blocked. In this respect, they allege that this constitutes an illegal
appropriation of his money, thus that his right to private property, established at Article 21 of the
American Convention, was violated.
They argue that even though the military criminal jurisdiction is a special jurisdiction,
the alleged victim participated in the process and appealed the order to proceed to trial handed
down on November 25, 1998, as this was the last procedural act allowed the parties under law.
Subsequently, they alleged that the Court of Military Justice vacated the proceedings due to the lack
of jurisdiction of the military judge 1, by order of November 16, 1999. From the information provided
by the petitioners, it appears that the Judge ordered that the matter be sent to the regular
jurisdiction, and that the bond collected be returned. In addition, it appears that the sanction of 200
sucres was imposed “on the Judge of Law and the Criminal Law Judge of 1-ZA” in keeping with
Article 159 of the Code of Military Criminal Procedure. 2 They argue that said order exhausted
domestic remedies, given that it was not appealable.
From the information presented by the petitioners it appears that on November 20,
1999, the Judge of the First Aerial Zone notified him of the collection of the cost of forwarding the
matter to the regular jurisdiction, which prompted a complaint by the petitioners, and that they
requested that the bond be returned, in keeping with the ruling to vacate the matter, yet that
complaint was rejected. On December 20, 1999, they requested a hearing before the Ministry of
Defense to explain why his rights violated– through the preventive detention order, the blocking of
bank account, the prohibition on the alienation of assets, and the bond deposited that had not been
returned – should be vindicated. On January 11, 2000, the petitioner sent a brief to the President of
the Court of Military Justice along the same lines.
They indicate that on February 28, 2000, when the alleged victim went to the Air Base
to recover that bond, he was once again detained by members of the military intelligence service
and held incommunicado from 10:30 am to 2:00 pm in the offices of intelligence. They indicate that
as there was no arrest warrant, the Center for Provisional Detention of Quito refused to receive him.
They allege that a member of the police agreed to write up a false police report stating that he made
the arrest at calle Montúfar, when in reality it was at the “Mariscal Sucre” Air Base.
They argue that the attorney for the alleged victim went to the air base to inquire into
his whereabouts, and that the Military Criminal Judge denied that Gonzalo Cortéz had been
detained. They indicate that on March 2, 2000, a writ of habeas corpus was filed that reported the
illegal and arbitrary detention; it was rejected on March 8, 2000, as unfounded. They argue that the
arrest warrant was issued four days after his detention by the Third Judge of Pichincha, on March
3, 2000, along with the start-up of a proceeding against him for the same robbery. They argue that

Code of Military Criminal Procedure of Ecuador. “Article 166.- The following are causes of nullity of military
proceedings: 1. Lack of jurisdiction or competence….”

Code of Military Criminal Procedure of Ecuador. “Article 159.- In case of omission of a material formality the
proceeding shall be annulled and a fine shall be imposed on the person responsible….”

Select target paragraph3