5 26. The State argues that for the first detention the petitioners should have filed a writ of habeas corpus, which is the adequate remedy. It argues that said remedy was doubly regulated, both in the Constitution and in the Law on the Municipal Regime. It also indicates that according to the Code of Criminal Procedure, which is the supplemental law for the Code of Military Criminal Procedure, by means of the writ of habeas corpus the alleged victim or anyone on his behalf could turn to the Court of Military Justice for it to order, if appropriate, his immediate release. 27. In this regard, with respect to the first detention of the alleged victim, the State argues that the petitioner did not exhaust available remedies. It alleges that participating in the military criminal jurisdiction, not saying that he was a civilian, and not asking the criminal judge to recuse himself, but being under his jurisdiction and requesting evidence, is not tantamount to exhausting domestic remedies. It argues that the only remedy that the alleged victim pursued was the appeal before the Court of Military Justice, which was effective, as the proceedings were declared null for lack of jurisdiction on November 16, 1999. 28. It argues that the military criminal proceeding was declared null by the Court of Military Justice on November 16, 1999; it ordered that the case be removed to a regular judge, and that in April 2000 the Third Court for Criminal Matters of Pichincha took cognizance of the accusation. It argues that when the petitioners filed the petition the regular criminal proceeding was pending resolution; it culminated in a decision that the action had prescribed on September 2, 2009, accordingly the petition should have been presented after that date. 29. In response to the petitioners’ argument with respect to the violation of the reasonable time in the regular criminal proceeding (see supra III.A), the State answered that the alleged victim could have filed an action before the contentious-administrative judge to obtain compensation and other reparations for the alleged inadequate administration of justice, and that therefore there was no exhaustion of domestic remedies. 30. The State alleges that the first detention of the alleged victim, on July 11, 1997, was carried out with the institution of criminal proceedings, in March 1997, when his provisional detention was ordered, accordingly he was detained by order issued by a judge with jurisdiction. 31. It also argues that the alleged victim was brought before the judge on July 14, 1997, in response to which the next day the judge issued the order to hold him in the Center for Provisional Detention. It states that in response to that decision, the alleged victim’s attorney came forward stating that he wanted to continue to be at the orders of the military criminal judge, he asked that he be detained in the military prison until his innocence was shown, since his life was at risk at the regular detention center, given that the inmates had a negative attitude towards members of the armed forces. It argues that the judge accepted that request to safeguard the life of the alleged victim. In response to the petitioners’ argument on the violation of Article 5 (see supra III.A), the State answered that it guaranteed the personal integrity of the alleged victim on accepting his request not to be transferred to a regular detention center where his life would be in danger. 32. The State alleges that at the moment the criminal proceedings were instituted and the arrest warrant was issued, and the alleged victim detained, procedurally there was no record of his status as a civilian, and that the military judge had to investigate it, therefore he was the judge with jurisdiction. Indeed, no complaint was ever presented arguing lack of jurisdiction of the judge, nor any request for disqualification, but to the contrary interest was expressed in continuing to be at the judge’s orders. It argues that the alleged victim’s status as a civilian was set forth in the proceeding subsequently, with which, through the appeal, the proceedings were declared null.