8 45. The constitutional habeas corpus remedy must be filed with the mayor or president of the council.5 In this respect, both the Inter-American Commission6 and the Inter-American Court have established that the presentation of a writ of habeas corpus before an administrative authority does not constitute an adequate remedy under the standards of the American Convention 7; therefore one cannot require that it be exhausted. 46. In terms of the remedy of legal habeas corpus established in the Code of Criminal Procedure8, the Commission notes that in view of the incommunicado detention to which Gonzalo Cortéz was said to have been subjected in his first detention, he and his family members or attorneys would not have had any real possibility of pursuing such a remedy during the first days of detention, when this remedy is effective. Considering that the alleged victim was impeded from exhausting it, due to the incommunicado detention to which he is said to have been subjected, the Commission considers that the exception to the exhaustion of domestic remedies set out at Article 46(2)(b) applies to this part of the petition. 47. In relation to the second detention, effectuated without a judicial order, on February 28, 2000, the petitioners filed a writ of habeas corpus on March 2, 2000, which was rejected, and a complaint before the Prosecutor of the Court of Military Justice, on March 9, 2000, which was said to produce no result. In addition, they filed a second writ of habeas corpus on March 28, 2000, which was also rejected.9 In the face of that rejection, they filed an appeal with the Constitutional Court that was resolved favorably on May 9, 2000, considering that the detention was carried out without a judicial order; accordingly the alleged victim was released. 48. The Commission considers that in this petition the domestic remedies available were exhausted by the decision of the Constitutional Court of May 9, 2000. Therefore, this part of the petition complies with the requirement established at Article 46(1)(a) of the American Convention. 49. As for the contentious-administrative action to which the State makes reference, the Commission considers that for this petition, what was argued earlier applies, in that the decisions handed down by the contentious-administrative jurisdiction are not suitable remedies for satisfying Article 46 of the American Convention. The contentious-administrative jurisdiction is a mechanism for supervising the administrative activity of the State, and that only allows for obtaining compensation for damages. Accordingly, that process is not suitable for this claim 10, and therefore one cannot require that it be exhausted. 50. The petitioners also allege delay in the regular criminal proceeding against the alleged victim, which was ended in 2010 after the action was found to have prescribed, in his favor, 10 years after it was brought, which caused him harm. In this respect, the Commission considers that when it is the State that begins a criminal action, it must culminate the process within a 5 Article 19(17)(j) of the Ecuadorian Constitution of 1979. 6 IACHR, Report No. 66/01 Dayra María Levoyer Jiménez, June 14, 2001, paras. 78-81. 7 I/A Court H.R., Case of Chaparro Álvarez and Lapo Íñiguez. Judgment of November 21, 2007 Series C No. 114, para. 8 Article 458 of the 1983 Code of Criminal Procedure of Ecuador. 128. 9 In both the writs of habeas corpus and in the complaint presented to the prosecutor, the petitioners alleged the commission of an illegal and arbitrary detention by members of the military intelligence service, as well as the preparation of a false arrest report by a state agent, and they asked that the applicable sanctions be imposed. IACHR. Report No. No. 68/09, Wilfredo Quiñónez Barcenas and family v. Colombia, August 5, 2009, para. 42 and Report No. 123/10 Gerson Jahirzinho González Arrollo v. Colombia, October 23, 2010, para. 45. 10