62 188. The total delay amounts to approximately seven months and a half, due to the judge of the Second Civil and Commercial First Instance Court abstaining himself, which gave rise to the series of abstentions previously mentioned, presented by other judges and members of the criminal chambers, as well as the referral for consultation of the abstentions, the decision of the First Civil Chamber, the wrongful remittance of the case file to another judge, followed by the dispute over jurisdiction, until, finally, the processing of the case was assigned to the judge of the Seventh Civil and Commercial First Instance Court. 189. The Court takes into account that in its final written arguments, the State indicated that the law applicable to the abstention procedure has been amended and that, to that end, “it established a regime of abstentions and challenges for judges and criminal courts, which provided more specific grounds for abstentions and challenges. It also defined who could present abstentions and challenges to avoid the wrongful practice by which anybody (even witnesses) could request challenges, and provided its own procedures to add expediency to the regime.” The State transcribed the corresponding provisions, which are not the subject matter of the analysis in the instant case given that they were not applied. 190. Based on the foregoing, the Court concludes that the constant presentation of abstentions affected the seriousness of the conduct of the domestic criminal proceedings. And that those abstentions affected the processing of this case due to the delays brought as a result of the judicial system’s minimal control, which, as a consequence of the legislation applied, left to the judges’ discretion the referral of abstentions to superior authorities for consultation as to their legality, all of this while threatened with a penalty if the abstentions were declared legal. 191. Therefore, the Court deems that, regarding this aspect, there was not only a violation of Article 8(1) of the Convention but also of Article 2 therein, since the corresponding legislation hindered the correct conduct of the proceeding. B.4. About the classification of forced disappearance 192. The Commission alleged that at the moment of the facts of the case, the crime of forced disappearance was not classified under Bolivian law. [The Commission] mentioned that the State ratified the Inter-American Convention on Forced Disappearance on May 5, 1999, but that it classified this crime recently, on January 18, 2006. Therefore, it considered that between May 5, 1999, and January 18, 2006, the State failed to comply with the obligation established in Article III of the Convention on Forced Disappearance, in relation to Article IV therein. 193. The Court has already referred to the general obligation of the States to adapt its domestic law to the norms of the American Convention. This is also applicable when dealing with the enactment of the Convention on Forced Disappearance, since it derives from the rule of customary law according to which a State, who has entered into an international covenant, must include within its domestic law the necessary changes to ensure its compliance with the obligations undertaken. 194. In the judgment of the case of Ticona Estrada v. Bolivia, the Tribunal already declared the State’s non-compliance with the obligations established in Articles 1.d) and III of the Convention on Forced Disappearance, and in Article 2 of the American Convention, since it was not until January 18, 2006, that Bolivia incorporated the crime of forced disappearance into its legislation. In this respect, the Court considers that a new