66 conviction of some of the persons accused for the crimes of unlawful deprivation of liberty and complicity in that crime. B.5.1. Ruling of the Second Criminal Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice of the Nation 205. On June 2, 2010, the Second Criminal Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice of the Nation (hereinafter, “Second Criminal Chamber”) pronounced a preliminary decision, within the framework of the substantiation of several appeal remedies filed, among others, by Ms. Rebeca Ibsen Castro, by which the court annulled the previously decreed prescriptions (supra paras. 203 and 204). In said decision it is observed that the Second Criminal Chamber ordered the processing of the action “until the corresponding final resolution was issued,” and that, among other considerations, it establishes that “[t]he judgment, specifically related to the case, […] of February 2, 2000, ordered by the InterAmerican Court of Human Rights, [expresses] that the State has the obligation to eliminate the obstacle of the statute of limitation of the criminal action aiming at the criminal sanction of those responsible of the crime of forced disappearance of persons.”243 206. Likewise, on August 16, 2010, the Second Criminal Chamber issued a judgment condemning two of the individuals accused of the crime of forced disappearance, and another one accused of complicity in the perpetration of said crime. From the judgment it is concluded that said Chamber confirmed the acquittal of another of the defendants due to lack of “full proof beyond any reasonable doubt.” Nevertheless, this Court observes that said judgment establishes that “in relation to the murder of Rainer Ibsen Cárdenas, because of the violent manner leading to his death in which it occurred, and the circumstances under which his liberty was deprived, as well as the accusations of inhumane treatment and torture of José Luis Ibsen Peña […], is not feasible to apply the statute of limitations given that such acts are classified as crimes against humanity within […] the Statute of Rome […] due to the form and circumstances under which they occurred, the perpetrators of the crimes and the ruling government at that time, characterized by the judicial disrespect for rights and liberties […], it is not possible to apply the [Statute of Rome] because the ratione temporis jurisdiction to prosecute applies only for crimes committed after July 17, 1998, [and Bolivia] ratified that instrument […] on June 27, 2002 [, …]. Hence, the dispositions of the Statute of Rome" cannot be applied in the murder of Rainer Ibsen Cárdenas and in the degrading treatment and tortures “suffered by José Luis Ibsen Peña.”244 207. The Court emphasizes that the recent ruling by the Second Criminal Chamber regarding the application of the crime of forced disappearance to the acts suffered by Mr. José Luis Ibsen Peña is in accordance with the jurisprudence of this Tribunal. However, regarding those acts related to the torture and inhumane treatment to which by Mr. José Luis Ibsen Peña was subjected to, or the murder of Mr. Rainer Ibsen Cárdenas, this Court considers it convenient to recall that it has already indicated that in criminal matters, the statute of limitations determines the termination of the punitive claims by the passage of time, and that, generally, it limits the punitive power of the State to prosecute illegal 243 Cf. Judgment of the Second Criminal Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice of the Nation of June 2, 2010 (case file on the merits, volume V, folios 1967 to 1968). De la lectura de esta decisión se infiere que hace referencia a la Sentencia de la Corte Interamericana en el caso Trujillo Oroza Vs. Bolivia. Reparaciones y Costas. Sentencia de 27 de febrero de 2002. Serie C No. 92. 244 Cf. Judgment of the Second Criminal Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice of the Nation on August 16, 2010 (case file on the merits, volume V, folios 2000 to 2001 and 2005 to 2006).

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