5 29. As for the argument of the petitioners regarding the surprise scheduling of a hearing by the Second Appellate Chamber for Criminal and Correctional Matters of the Judicial Department of Mercedes, the State claims that the court deemed it necessary to hold an additional hearing in order to put the parties on an equal footing in their ability to defend themselves. It notes that at the first hearing the defendants took the floor to speak on two occasions, while the plaintiffs did so only once, which prompted the scheduling of an additional hearing in order to strike a procedural balance and hear arguments on the facts of the case. 30. The State asserts that both the plaintiffs and the defendants were served notice of this hearing. It affirms that the defense attorney for the alleged victims participated in this proceeding and, therefore, their absence does not amount to a violation of due process rights. It further contends that both parties appealed the trial court judgment and it was proper to supplement the first hearing by providing an opportunity to the plaintiffs to argue on the points about which they had not submitted any pleadings, which were part of the appeal, and about which the defendants and their attorneys had extensively argued during the first hearing convened by the appellate court. 31. The State claims that the alleged victims enjoyed all due process rights at both the trial and appellate levels. It argues that after the appeals decision was handed down, the alleged victims improperly sought extraordinary remedies in both the provincial and the federal sphere. It notes that they attempted to file an appeal to the Supreme Court of Justice of the Province of Buenos Aires, pleading grounds for a Writ of inapplicability of the law, which is why the appeal was denied by the high court. The State asserts that the alleged victims filed a federal appeal against this decision, which was also denied. It claims that, in light of this, the defendants filed a Motion for Reconsideration of an Interlocutory Order (Recurso de Revocatoria), which was denied because it was evident that the challenged ruling is not subject to reconsideration. 32. As to the argument of the petitioner that Mr. Carlos Memoli was convicted because his attorney had used a particular expression in an administrative proceeding, the State contends that this assertion is not part of the consideration and decision of the courts, which heard the case. It notes that Mr. Carlos Memoli was convicted for a number of acts of slander expressed through different ways, and not for the aforementioned expression in an administrative proceeding. 33. The State argues that the alleged victims misused the appeals procedure and, therefore, have not adequately exhausted domestic remedies. It notes that the petitioners’ claim does nothing more than call into question the judgment issued by the Argentinean courts in the suit. In this regard, it contends that the Commission cannot review judgments of domestic courts that act within the sphere of their competence and apply due process guarantees. 34. The State contends that it has not violated the freedom of expression of the alleged victims, inasmuch as the criminal sanction imposed on them is expressly and previously established by law, and meets the requirements for the subsequent imposition of liability in order to protect the right to honor and reputation of the plaintiffs. It asserts that these elements conform to the requirements set forth in Article 13.2 of the American Convention. 35. With regard to the civil action for damages against the petitioners, the State did not express a position during the merits stage. However, during the admissibility stage the State argued that because this process is still ongoing, the petitioner’s allegations should be considered in the domestic proceedings and not before the IACHR. 36. Finally, the State notes that two judges for civil matters of the Judicial Department of Mercedes were sanctioned with a “warning” for “delays in ruling.” It further states that Dr. Etchegaray, Judge of Court No. 10 for Civil and Commercial Matters, was sanctioned for delaying a ruling on an objection to disqualification of license in the Memoli’s case and Dr. Cuestas, Judge of Court No. 1 for Civil and Commercial Matters, was sanctioned for recusing herself from the Memoli case twice. The State