10 international law as a legal order endowed with an intrinsic value of its own (and thereby superior to a simply "voluntary" law), - as well recalled by H. Accioly32, - as it derives its authority from certain principles of sound reason (est dictatum rectae rationis). 27. In the present Judgment in the case of Constantine and Others versus Trinidad and Tobago, the Court has rightly pondered that, if restrictions interposed in the instrument of acceptance of its contentious jurisdiction were accepted, in the terms proposed by the respondent State in the cas d'espèce, not expressly foreseen in Article 62 of the American Convention, this "would lead to a situation in which the Court would have as first parameter of reference the Constitution of the State and only subsidiarily the American Convention, situation which would bring about a fragmentation of the international legal order of protection of human rights and would render illusory the object and purpose of the American Convention" (par. 93). 28. that And the Court has, furthermore, in the present Judgment, correctly observed " (...) The instrument of acceptance, on the part of Trinidad and Tobago, of the contentious jurisdiction of the Tribunal, does not fit into the hypotheses foreseen in Article 62(2) of the Convention. It has a general scope, which ends up by subordinating the application of the American Convention to the domestic law of Trinidad and Tobago in a total way and pursuant to what its national tribunals decide. All this implies that this instrument of acceptance is manifestly incompatible with the object and purpose of the Convention" (par. 88). 29. This conclusion of the Court finds clear support in the precise, and quite clear, formulation of Article 62(2) of the American Convention. Bearing in mind the three component elements of the general rule of interpretation bona fides of treaties - text in the current meaning, context, and object and purpose of the treaty - set forth in Article 31(1) of the two Vienna Conventions on the Law of Treaties (of 1969 and 1986), it can be initially inferred that the text, in the current meaning (numerus clausus), of Article 62(2) of the American Convention, fully corroborates the decision taken by the Court in the present Judgment. 30. In the theory and practice of international law one has sought to distinguish a "reservation" from an "interpretative declaration" 33, in conformity with the legal effects which are intended to be attributed to one and the other 34: thus, if one intends to 32 . H. Accioly, Tratado de Derecho Internacional Público, volume I, Rio de Janeiro, Imprensa Nacional, 1945, p. 5. 33 . Cf. U.N./International Law Commission, "Draft Guidelines on Reservations to Treaties", in: U.N., Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its 51st Session (May/July 1999), G.A.O.R. Suppl. n. 10 (A/54/10/Corr.1-2), 1999, pp. 18-24, item 1.3; and in: Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its 52nd Session (May/June and July/August 2000), G.A.O.R. - Suppl. n. 10 (A/55/10), 2000, pp. 229-272, item 1.7; and cf. also, more recently, A. Pellet (special rapporteur), Sixth Report on Reservations to Treaties (Addendum), U.N./I.L.C. doc. A/CN.4/518/Add.1, of 21.05.2001, pp. 3-31, pars. 38-133. 34 . For an examination of the question, cf., e.g., F. Horn, Reservations and Interpretative Declarations to Multilateral Treaties, The Hague/Uppsala, T.M.C. Asser Institut/Swedish Institute of International Law, 1988, pp. 98-110 and 229-337, and cf. pp. 184-222; D.M. McRae, "The Legal Effect of Interpretative Declarations", 49 British Year Book of International Law (1978) pp. 155-173.