DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE EDUARDO VIO GROSSI JUDGMENT OF THE INTER-AMERICAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, MERITS, REPARATIONS AND COSTS, CASE OF BARBANI ET AL. V. URUGUAY, OF OCTOBER 13, 2011. Introduction This dissenting opinion is issued concerning the aspects of the judgment in reference (hereinafter, the judgment) that are indicated below, for the reasons stated. The first matter on which I disagree with what is said and decided in the judgment is with regard to the violation of Article 8(1) of the American Convention on Human Rights (hereinafter, the Convention), based on decisions adopted by the Central Bank of Uruguay (hereinafter, the Bank), under the provisions of article 31 of Law No. 17,613 of the Oriental Republic of Uruguay (hereinafter, the State). And my second disagreement with the content of the judgment, on the same grounds, relates to the violation of Article 25 of the Convention. I. Violation of Article 8(1) of the Convention. Regarding the first aspect, it is necessary to describe the pertinent facts of the case and then analyze the international convention-based norm that is applied in the judgment, all with the respective consequences. A. Facts The relevant facts that, in my opinion, are of interest in relation to this aspect are the decisions of the Central Bank based on the provisions of article 31 of the said Law No. 17,613, a norm that, for the effects of this case and of international law, constitutes a fact.1 The latter provision (hereinafter, article 31) establishes: “The Central Bank of Uruguay is hereby authorized to grant depositors of the Banco de Montevideo and the Banco La Caja Obrera, whose deposits have been 1 Art. 62 of the Convention: “1. A State Party may, upon depositing its instrument of ratification or adherence to this Convention, or at any subsequent time, declare that it recognizes as binding, ipso facto, and not requiring special agreement, the jurisdiction of the Court on all matters relating to the interpretation or application of this Convention. […] 2…. 3. The jurisdiction of the Court shall comprise all cases concerning the interpretation and application of the provisions of this Convention that are submitted to it, provided that the States Parties to the case recognize or have recognized such jurisdiction, whether by special declaration pursuant to the preceding paragraphs, or by a special agreement.” Art. 27 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: “Internal law and observance of treaties. A party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty. This rule is without prejudice to article 46.”

Select target paragraph3