30 is, among others, “to set a point in time for the sake of the certainty and legal security that must prevail in and inspire every judicial process for the pursuit of justice;” e) one bona fide interpretation of the condition set forth by the State in its declaration of recognition of the Court’s contentious jurisdiction, as well as common sense, indicate that the former refers to events or legal actions as elements that generate, per se, alleged human rights violations. “In the instant case this means that the only category of events or actions over which the Court may exercise its contentious jurisdiction is that of events or actions that occurred after December 16, 1998, and only if it were alleged that said actions could, per se, be construed as violations of the American Convention;” f) in processing the instant case the Court must limit itself to the purpose of the application filed by the Commission, within the bounds of the chronological terms indicated by the declaration of recognition of the Court’s contentious jurisdiction, since it “would not be able to do so outside of such bounds, lest it deliver an ultra petita decision.” [] In this sense, the Commission stated that the events that took place before December 16, 1998, are considered “precedents;” g) the only thing “that [the Commission] deplores of all things that have occurred after December 16, 1998, is the special annulment remedy known as ‘recognition of innocence of the accused,’ that was artfully filed by the [representatives of the alleged victim and his relatives] on April 05, 1999;” h) the Inter-American court cannot judge facts and events, or the alleged effects thereof, beyond the time limitations to which the date of recognition of its contentious jurisdiction by the State holds it. In a case like this, the Court could refer to such facts only in a descriptive manner and is not allowed to issue a moral judgment on their legality or illegality or, by the same reason, on whether or not an alleged violation of human rights was committed; i) no events or actions prior to December 16, 1998, were of a “continuous,” not in the least of a “permanent or undetermined” nature, such as the Commission and the representatives of the alleged victim and his next of kin attempt to describe them, since all relevant events and actions took place and ended at times that are perfectly defined in chronological terms prior to said date. In this sense, “having occurred prior to December 16, 1998, the arrest whose legality was not challenged, the preliminary investigation, the prosecution at its two instances […] where Mr. Alfonso Martín-del-Campo’s penal liability was determined, and the amparo appeal hearing, among other things, cannot possibly be brought to the consideration, judgment or decision of the Court.” For this reason, judging the effects of said events would be “to extend de facto the temporary jurisdiction of the Court making its effects retroactive;” j) of relevance regarding to this preliminary objection, are the criteria on the “non continued” nature of imprisonment per se. In addition, the latter is not itself a violation of the Convention; for which reason, in order to be qualified to judge the effects thereof, the Court would have to determine whether or not the initial events described as precedents were violations of the alleged victim’s human rights;