they must also be adequate and effective, as shown by the exceptions contemplated in Article 46(2). 19 26. It is the Court’s consistent case law that an objection to the exercise of its jurisdiction based on the failure to exhaust domestic remedies must be presented at the proper procedural moment; 20 in other words, during the admissibility proceedings before the Commission 21 and must precisely indicate the remedies that must be exhausted and their effectiveness. Here, however, the State alleged the failure to exhaust domestic remedies on events occurring after the admissibility stage and, therefore, the principle of procedural preclusion is not applicable. 22 The Court, nevertheless, considers that the State had the duty to present its arguments on admissibility before the Commission at the first possible opportunity. 23 The Court notes that, as indicated by the Commission and not rebutted by the State, when the Commission was informed of these supervening events, they were transmitted to the State, which had the opportunity to submit the observations that it deemed pertinent, including, if it so wished, the exception to the exhaustion of the corresponding domestic remedies. The Court observes that the State filed this preliminary objection for the first time with its answering brief; in other words, at a procedural moment long after it was informed on these supervening events and, therefore, its presentation is time-barred and thus the preliminary objection is rejected. V PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATION 27. The State questioned the inclusion of various groups of alleged victims by the Commission and indicated that: 1) Of the 4,091 persons identified by the Commission, 30 should be excluded as it has not been able to fully identify them domestically. 2) The Commission did not identify, in its Merits Report, 2,317 former maritime and port workers represented by FEMAPOR who have continued their claims since March 2010 and, therefore, the State requested that they be excluded from the case. 3) Of these 2,317 alleged victims, there were questions about 64 persons since it was considered that they were not part of this subsequent domestic proceeding. 4) Finally, it questioned the addition, by the representative Meneses Huayra of 310 24 persons who were not part of the sub-group of 2,317 alleged victims. 28. The representative Meneses Huayra argued that the group of “2,317” alleged victims were part of the 4,091 [sic] alleged victims who were the beneficiaries of the decision of February 12 and, therefore, should not be excluded from this process. Cf. Case of Velásquez Rodríguez v. Honduras. Merits. Judgment of July 29, 1988. Series C No. 4, para. 63 and Case of Muelle Flores v. Peru. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of March 6, 2019. Series C No. 375, para. 25. 20 Cf. Case of Velásquez Rodríguez v. Honduras. Preliminary Objections, supra, para. 88 and Case of Muelle Flores v. Peru, supra, para. 26. 21 Cf. Case of Herrera Ulloa v. Costa Rica. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of July 2, 2004. Series C No. 107, para. 81 and Case of Teachers of Chañaral and other municipalities v. Chile, supra, para. 21. 22 Cf. Case of Chitay Nech et al. v. Guatemala. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of May 25, 2010. Series C No. 212, para. 28 and Case of Mémoli v. Argentina. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of August 22, 2013. Series C No. 265, para. 48. 23 Cf. Case of Mémoli v. Argentina, supra, para. 50. 24 Infra para. 34 and footnote 31. 19 9