75. In terms of reasonable time, the Inter-American Court has indicated that the right of access to justice implies that the settlement of the dispute should be produced within a reasonable time, because a prolonged delay can constitute, in itself, a violation of the right to a fair trial. 49 The Court has established that four elements must be considered to determine whether a time period is reasonable: a) the complexity of the matter, b) the procedural activity of the interested party, c) the conduct of the judicial authorities, and d) the impairment to the legal situation of the person involved in the proceedings.50 76. With regard to the right to a defense and the principle of consistency, the Commission notes that the charge brought against the alleged victim on March 12, 2002, for poor performance of duties stated that in the context of Case No. 9936, he met the grounds established in Article 14, subparagraphs (b), (g), (n), and (p) of Law No. 1084. The charge indicated, with respect to subparagraph (b), that Mr. Nissen Pessolani broke procedural rules to take a statement, failed to investigate exculpatory facts, and engaged in acts of intimidation by threatening higher penalties. With regard to subparagraph (g), the accuser stated that the alleged victim applied the money laundering law when that was not appropriate. Regarding subparagraph (n), the accuser maintained that the information and statements made by Mr. Nissen were innumerable and that this could be corroborated simply by requesting newspaper editions and tapes from television stations. Finally, in terms of subparagraph (p), the accuser specified that the then-prosecutor offered procedural benefits in exchange for statements. As can be seen in the JEM ruling of April 7, 2003, the alleged victim answered the formal charge on April 16, 2002, denying each of the counts attributed to him. The ruling in question determined that the alleged victim met the grounds established in subparagraphs (b), (g), and (n) of Article 14 of Law No. 1084. 77. The Commission observes that in its judgment of April 7, 2003, the Jury for the Prosecution of Magistrates modified the factual basis of the indictment, failing to observe the principle of consistency. Specifically, with regard to the grounds established in Article 14, subparagraph (n), the Commission notes that the JEM held that the alleged victim “provided information and made comments and declarations to the press…that went beyond the sensitive parameters of criminal investigation in its preliminary stage” and affected those involved. However, in analyzing subparagraphs (b) and (g) of Article 14, the JEM added facts that were different than those set forth in the formal charge, which in its opinion constituted the grounds mentioned above. 78. First, with respect to subparagraph (b), the JEM maintained that by intervening in Case No. 9936, Mr. Nissen Pessolani failed to comply with Resolution No. 68 of February 2, 2001, issued by the Office of the Prosecutor General of the State, which referred to the distribution of cases on a rotational basis. That aspect was not included in the initial charge. 79. Second, in ruling on subparagraph (g), the JEM argued that it “should address” some of the steps the alleged victim took in the context of the sanction proceeding, which also constituted grounds for removal. To that effect, it concluded that Mr. Nissen had arrogated to himself powers that belonged solely to the JEM, for having included in the case file of the proceedings against him an expert witness statement regarding a document presented by his accuser that allegedly included an unverified signature. That procedural action, as is evident, is also not covered in the charge. 80. The Commission thus observes that if disciplinary bodies can in fact carry out investigations or procedural steps to examine the conduct of those subject to its review, it is necessary to ensure that the right of defense can be exercised, a matter that is especially important when the case involves justice operators and when the most severe punishment is removal from office. In this specific case, based on what has been laid out, the factual basis established in the formal charge was modified without Mr. Nissen Pessolani being able to mount a defense in regard to the matter. This substantial modification brought with it the possibility of imposing—as indeed occurred—the maximum punishment in a proceeding of this type, which is dismissal. I/A Court H.R., Case of Heliodoro Portugal v. Panama, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment of August 12, 2008. Series C No. 186, para. 148, and Case of Salvador Chiriboga v. Ecuador, Preliminary Objection and Merits, Judgment of May 6, 2008, Series C No. 179, para. 59. 50 IACHR, Report No. 75/15, Case 12.923, Merits, Rocío San Miguel Sosa and Others, Venezuela, October 28, 2015, para. 200; I/A Court H.R., Case of Kawas Fernández v. Honduras, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment of April 3, 2009, Series C No. 196, para. 112. 49 15