81. With regard to reasonable time, the Commission notes that Article 31 of Law No. 1084 provides that a final judgment must be issued within 180 days of the proceeding being initiated. The case file shows that the JEM began prosecution of the alleged victim by issuing a notification on March 18, 2002. It is also evident that the judgment was issued on April 7, 2003, in other words, 384 days after the case was begun. Subsequent to that, the petition of unconstitutionality lodged by the petitioner was ruled on by the Supreme Court on June 16, 2004. The Commission deems that the JEM’s failure to comply with the legal time frames in which to issue a judgment, in a case that was not highly complex, violates the reasonable time guarantee. Based on the foregoing considerations, the IACHR considers that the Paraguayan State is responsible for violating the rights established in Article 8(1) and 8(2)(b) and (c) of the American Convention, in conjunction with Article 1(1) thereof, to the detriment of Alejandro Nissen Pessolani. 4. The right to reasoned decisions,51 the principle of legality,52 and the right to freedom of expression53 82. The principle of legality recognized in Article 9 of the Convention governs the actions of State bodies that arise from the exercise of the State’s punitive power.54 That principle applies to disciplinary proceedings, which are “an expression of the punitive powers of the State,” as they entail impairment or alteration of people’s rights as a consequence of a wrongful conduct.55 83. The Commission has indicated that compliance with the principle of legality allows people to effectively determine their conduct in accordance with the law.56 As the IACHR has stated, “The principle of legality has a specific role in the definition of crimes; on the one hand, it guarantees individual liberty and safety by preestablishing the behavior that is penalized clearly and unambiguously and, on the other hand, it protects legal certainty.”57 84. The precision of a norm establishing a sanction of a disciplinary nature may be different from that required in a criminal matter, owing to the nature of the disputes that each one is designed to resolve.58 However, it must be predictable, “either because the punishable conduct is expressly and clearly established, precisely, clearly and previously, by law, or because the law delegates its imposition to the judge or to an infra-legal norm, under objective criteria that limit the scope of discretion.”59 85. The obligation to provide grounds for decisions translates into the “reasoned justification” that allows the judge to reach a conclusion.60 That guarantee is closely related to the principle of legality, since on the premise Article 8(1) of the Convention establishes the following: “Every person has the right to a hearing, with due guarantees and within a reasonable time, by a competent, independent, and impartial tribunal, previously established by law, in the substantiation of any accusation of a criminal nature made against him or for the determination of his rights and obligations of a civil, labor, fiscal, or any other nature.” 52 Article 9 of the Convention establishes the following: “No one shall be convicted of any act or omission that did not constitute a criminal offense, under the applicable law, at the time it was committed. A heavier penalty shall not be imposed than the one that was applicable at the time the criminal offense was committed. If subsequent to the commission of the offense the law provides for the imposition of a lighter punishment, the guilty person shall benefit therefrom.” 53 Article 13 of the Convention establishes: “1. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought and expression. This right includes freedom to seek, receive, and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing, in print, in the form of art, or through any other medium of one’s choice.” 54 IACHR, Criminalization of the Work of Human Rights Defenders, OEA/Ser.L/V/Doc.49/15, December 31, 2015, para. 253. 55 I/A Court H.R., Case of López Lone et al. v. Honduras, Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment of October 5, 2015, Series C No. 302, para. 257; Case of Maldonado Ordoñez v. Guatemala, Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment of May 3, 2016, Series C No. 311, para. 89; and Case of Baena-Ricardo et al. v. Panama, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment of February 2, 2001, Serie C. No. 72, paras. 106 and 108. 56 IACHR, Report on Terrorism and Human Rights, OEA/SER.L/V/II.116, Doc. 5 rev. 1 corr., October 22, 2002, para. 225, and Executive Summary, para. 17. 57 IACHR, Application and submissions to the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in the Case of De la Cruz Flores v. Peru; referred to in: I/A Court H.R., Case of De la Cruz Flores v. Peru, Judgment of November 18, 2004, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Series C. No. 115, para. 74. 58 I/A Court H.R., Case of López Lone et al. v. Honduras, Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment of October 5, 2015, Series C No. 302, para. 257. 59 I/A Court H.R., Case of López Lone et al. v. Honduras, Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment of October 5, 2015, Series C No. 302, para. 259. 60 I/A Court H.R., Case of Maldonado Ordoñez v. Guatemala, Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment of May 3, 2016, Series C No. 311, para. 87. 51 16