measures of compensation agreed by the CGC. Consequently, the declaration of force majeure remained in effect and the contract was terminated without a single barrel of oil having been extracted. 132. With regard to the alleged violation of the freedom of expression of the Sarayaku People, the State considered that, based on the facts of this case, no act or omission that harmed them can be inferred and that can be attributed to it. 133. The State underscored that, in general, it had guaranteed the access to political participation by the indigenous peoples; more completely as of the 1990s, and that the Sarayaku leaders had held numerous positions of political power in public institutions and had participated in many elections. In addition, with regard to political participation in consultations on mining activities, the State reiterated that, at the time of the concession, Ecuador had not accepted any domestic or international legal framework that recognized the right to culture as a crosscutting element of public policies related to natural resource extraction. Consequently, the institutions and mechanisms enabling the indigenous peoples to exercise political participation before natural resource extraction projects were undertaken had not been incorporated in such a way as to constitute a justiciable right. Lastly, the State recalled that the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, ILO Convention No. 169, and a wide range of diffuse and collective constitutional rights were implemented as of 1998. A.2 Freedom of Movement and Residence153 134. The Commission argued that the impossibility of the Sarayaku People to move freely within their own territory, and their inability to leave it, all with the acquiescence and participation of State agents, leads to the conclusion that the State is responsible for the violation of the freedom of movement, protected by Article 22 of the American Convention, to the detriment of the members of the Sarayaku People. Specifically, the Commission considered that the State was fully aware of the problem of freedom of movement affecting the Sarayaku People, but did not offer or implement the necessary or sufficient measures of protection to remedy this situation. In this regard, the Commission recalled that travel by boat by the Bobonaza River is the most usual form of transport for members of the Community, who cannot use the air strip given that for many years it was not suitable for the takeoff and landing of airplanes. The Commission also argued that the State is responsible for having prevented the freedom of movement and travel of the Sarayaku People by setting up military outposts. Finally, it also mentioned that the placement of explosives on the community’s territory affected the free movement of its members, reducing the areas in which they could look seek food and ensure their subsistence. 135. Based on the foregoing, the representatives argued that the violation was constituted, first, because of the State’s failure to provide protection to guarantee the Sarayaku People’s freedom of movement on the Bobonaza River and within their own territory, despite being aware of the attacks and restrictions on this right by third parties. In addition, the freedom of the Sarayaku to navigate on the river was directly restricted by soldiers stationed in Jatun Molino in January 2003. They argued that the police recognized that blockades were used by the community of Canelos as a repressive measure against the Sarayaku owing to the latter’s opposition to the oil activities. The representatives stated that these restrictions were disproportionate, given that the Sarayaku exercised their right of movement through the necessary access route to their territory without affecting others. They also recalled that these facts are even more serious, given that the Sarayaku 153 Article 22 of the American Convention states: “1. Every person lawfully in the territory of a State Party has the right to move about in it, and to reside in it subject to the provisions of the law. 2. Every person has the right to leave any country freely, including his own. 3. The exercise of the foregoing rights may be restricted only pursuant to a law to the extent necessary in a democratic society to prevent crime or to protect national security, public safety, public order, public morals, public health, or the rights or freedoms of others. 4. The exercise of the rights recognized in paragraph 1 may also be restricted by law in designated zones for reasons of public interest […]”. 34