2 have a duty not to enact laws or adopt measures that could be contrary to the terms of that Convention. Peru signed and ratified that Convention in exercise of its sovereignty, thereby undertaking the same obligation to observe its provisions to which the other States Party to the Convention pledged themselves. 4. This concurring vote will not repeat what the Court has already held; nor will it examine and describe Peru’s specific ordinances of Peru. Instead, its purpose is to analyze in general terms -but always by reference to the Judgment on reparationsthe scope that the Judgment might have in the matter under discussion here, and the ideas and concerns that, in the undersigned’s opinion, could have informed it. 5. In exercise of its advisory functions, the Court has previously issued opinions on laws that could have been in conflict with provisions of the Convention, since under articles 1 and 2 of the Convention, the States Parties have a duty to respect the rights and freedoms contained in that international instrument, ensure their free and full exercise and adopt the measures necessary to make them effective. Accordingly, it is the duty of those States to refrain from adopting provisions that do not conform to the object and purpose of the Convention (cf. Certain Attributes of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (Arts. 41, 42, 44, 46, 47, 50 and 51 of the American Convention on Human Rights), Advisory Opinion OC-13/93 of July 16, 1993. Series A No. 13, para. 26; and International Responsibility for the Promulgation and Enforcement of Laws in Violation of the Convention (Arts. 1 and 2 of the American Convention on Human Rights), Advisory Opinion OC-14/94 of December 9, 1994. Series A No. 14, paragraphs 32, 33, 50 and 58.1). These observations are, of course, refers to the legal effects of laws under international law, not the domestic legal effects of local laws within the State concerned (cf. OC14/94, para. 34). 6. In my opinion, the Court’s Judgment does not dismiss the advisability and need of amnesty provisions that serve to restore peace, under conditions of freedom and justice, in the wake of the internal conflicts that such measures and others are intended to help to resolve. Quite the contrary, it is plausible for an effort of this nature to be carried out under the aegis of the relevant principles of international and domestic law, with the sectors involved participating and within the framework of democratic institutions. 7. The question of amnesty laws has been examined at length in the recent literature on human rights. By their very nature, such laws imply that conduct prior to their promulgation will go unpunished. Those who have studied this issue, which is drawing increasing interest, attempt to balance the exigencies of peace and reconciliation with the duty to protect human rights and punish those who violate them, particularly when the violations are extraordinarily egregious -in other words, crimes of lese humanité such as genocide, extra-judicial execution, torture or forced disappearance-, while invoking the supposed demands posed by the struggle against subversion. Amnesty implies disremembering and remaining silent about acts that, in principle, are criminal in nature. However, this disremembrance and silence cannot be permitted to cover up the most severe human rights violations, violations that constitute an utter disregard for the dignity of the human being and are repugnant to the conscience of humanity.