5 10. As I see it, this argument becomes particularly compelling when the circumstances involve individuals that are in the custody of the State, and even more so when these individuals are children and adolescents (minors). Subsequently, in another case that encompassed both an individual and a collective dimension, in my Concurring Opinion in the Matter of the Communities of Jiguamiandó and Curbaradó regarding Colombia (Order on Provisional Measures of Protection of March 6, 2003), I allowed myself to insist on the need for the “recognition of the effects of the American Convention vis-à-vis third parties (the Drittwirkung),” —inherent in erga omnes obligations— “without which conventional obligations of protection would be reduced to little more than dead letter” (paras. 2–3). And I added that, from the circumstances surrounding the case, it was clear that: "the protection of human rights determined by the American Convention, to be effective, comprises not only the relations between the individuals and the public power, but also their relations with third parties (…). This reveals the new dimensions of the international protection of human rights, as well as the great potential of the existing mechanisms of protection, such as that of the American Convention, set in motion in order to protect collectively the members of a whole community,16 even though the basis of action is the breach —or the probability or imminence of breach— of individual rights.” (Para. 4). 11. It is clear from this Order that the obligation of a State to protect all persons within its jurisdiction encompasses the obligation to monitor the conduct of third-party individuals, which is an erga omnes obligation (Considering clauses No. 18 and 16). In fact, I have been working from within this Court on the conceptual and case law development of erga omnes protection obligations under the American Convention for a long time now. It is not my intention here to embark on a detailed discussion of the ideas I have already developed regarding this issue, particularly in my Concurring Opinions in the Orders on Provisional Measures of Protection adopted by the Court in the above-mentioned Matters of the Peace Community of San José de Apartadó (June 18, 2002), the Communities of Jiguamiandó and Curbaradó (March 6, 2003) and Urso Branco Prison (July 7, 2004) as well as in the Matters of Pueblo indígena de Kankuamo regarding Colombia (July 5, 2004), Pueblo indígena de Sarayaku regarding Ecuador (July 6, 2004), "Globovisión" Television Station regarding Venezuela (September 4, 2004) and Mendoza Prisons regarding Argentina (June 18, 2005), but to mention, albeit briefly, the key aspects of my views in this regard in order to ensure effective human rights protection in complex situations such as the one existing in this matter of the Penitentiary in Araraquara. 12. In truth, way before these cases were brought to this Court, I had already warned of the pressing need to promote the development of case law and jurisprudence on the legal framework of erga omnes obligations to protect human rights (e.g., in my Separate Opinions in the Judgment on the merits of January 24, 1998, para. 28, and the Judgment on reparations of January 22, 1999, para. 40, in the Case of Blake v. Guatemala). And in my Separate Opinion in the Case of Las Palmeras v. Colombia (Judgment on preliminary objections of February 4, 2000) I pointed out that a proper understanding of the broad scope of the general obligation to protect the rights enshrined in the American Convention, as set forth in Article 1(1) thereof, may contribute to the development of erga omnes protection obligations (paras. 2 and 6-7). 16 . Suggesting a similarity to class actions.