6 pertaining to the remedy of habeas corpus, to the determination of the compatibility or otherwise of the pertinent provisions of the Colombian domestic legislation with the American Convention, and to the harmonization that may be necessary of those legal provisions with the criteria set forth in the Convention 10, as well as to the determination of the legislative tipification of the crime of forced disappearance of persons. 15. As this Court itself pertinently warned one decade ago, in its eighth Advisory Opinion, ... habeas corpus performs a vital role in ensuring that a person's life and physical integrity are respected, in preventing his disappearance or the keeping of his whereabouts secret, and in protecting him against torture or other cruel, inhumane, or degrading punishment or treatment.11 The efficacy of habeas corpus is an imperative of the duty of prevention as one of the components of the general obligation to guarantee the protected rights (Article 1(1) of the Convention),12 including in order to avoid that situations are created in violation of the rights enshrined in the American Convention, such as that of forced disappearance of persons, which moreover lead to the impunity of the persons responsible for the facts constitutive of such crime. 16. The ensuring of the efficacy of habeas corpus is complementary, in the present case, in my view, with the other measure of non-pecuniary reparation, consisting in the legislative tipification of the crime of forced disappearance of persons, in conformity with the provisions of the Inter-American Convention on Forced Disappearance of Persons of 1994, even as a means of guaranteeing some of the rights protected by the American Convention on Human Rights (such as the right to life, Article 4, and the right to personal freedom, Article 7). The abovementioned tipification, mentioned by the Court in paragraph 56 of the present Judgment, in my understanding is, more than "desirable", necessary. It is foreseen in the aforementioned Convention of 1994 (Article IV), among other legislative obligations (Article III), which adds that the persons allegedly responsible for the facts constitutive of the crime of forced disappearance of persons "may be tried only in the competent jurisdictions of ordinary law in each State, to the exclusion of all other special jurisdictions, particular military jurisdiction" (Article IX). 13 10 That is, harmonization in the sense that the remedy of habeas corpus is not to limit itself only to ascertaining unlawful arrests or unlawful prolongations of deprivation of liberty, but, in addition, that it is also to confer, upon national judges, faculties to undertake the search of the persons at issue, with particular urgency. 11 Habeas Corpus in Emergency Situations (Arts. 27(2), 25(1) and 7(6) American Convention on Human Rights), Advisory Opinion OC-8/87, January 30 1987, Series A, n. 8, paragraph 35 (emphasis added). 12 One may recall that the the Court itself, on another occasion, linked such general obligation of Article 1(1) to the right to an effective remedy before the competent judges or tribunals, enshrined in Article 25(1), which "incorporates the principle, recognized in the international law of human rights, of the effectiveness of the procedural instruments or means designed to guarantee such rights". Judicial Guarantees in States of Emergency (Arts. 27(2), 25 and 8 American Convention on Human Rights), Advisory Opinion OC-9/87, of 06 October 1987, Series A, n. 9, paragraphs 22-24. 13 Article IX adds that the facts "constituting forced disappearance may not be deemed to have been committed in the course of military duties". And Article VII, in its turn, stipulates that "[c]riminal prosecution for the forced disappearance of persons and the penalty judicially imposed on its perpetrator shall not be subject to statutes of limitations".