20 C. Assessment of the evidence 67. In this case, as in others, the Court accepts the probative value of those documents forwarded by the parties at the opportune procedural moment, that were not contested or opposed, and whose authenticity was not questioned.54 In relation to the documents forwarded as helpful evidence (supra para. 9), the Court incorporates them into the body of evidence, in application of the provisions of Article 45(2) of the Rules of Procedure. 68. With regard to the testimony and the opinions given by the witness and the expert witnesses during the public hearing and in sworn statements, the Court considers them pertinent to the extent that they comply with the purpose defined by the President of the Court in the Order requiring them, taking into account any observations submitted by the parties.55 69. In this regard, the Commission observed that the sworn statement of the witness Sadi Pansera, offered by the State, “bore no relationship to the matter litigated in the instant case” and advised that it had no observations to make on the other sworn statements provided by the State and the representatives. 70. The representatives contested the way in which the testimonies of Sadi Pansera and Rolf Hackbart were rendered. They indicated that these statements were not made before notary public, but rather the latter merely authenticated the witnesses’ signature on the written statements. They stated that the correct procedure for an affidavit entailed “the State official, responsible for authenticating documents, receiving the statement and certifying its truth in the presence of the deponent.” Therefore, the requirements of Article 47 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court and the Order of the President of October 8, 2008, were not complied with. Consequently, they asked the Court not to consider the said testimony. The representatives also commented on the content of both statements.56 71. In its answer, the State claimed that the presumed victims should be heard just to provide information and not as witnesses, because they had an interest in the result of the case and did not have the necessary neutrality required of a witness. The State also submitted observations on the sworn statements of the witnesses Teresa Cofré and Marli Brambilla Kappaum and the expert witness Sérgio Sauer, offered by the representatives, and the witnesses Pedro Alves Cabral, Arlei José Escher and Delfino José Becker, offered by the Commission.57 54 Cf. Case of Velásquez Rodríguez v. Honduras. Merits. Judgment of July 29, 1988. Series C No. 4, para. 140; Case of Perozo et al., supra note 18, para. 94, and Case of Kawas Fernández, supra note 35, para. 39. 55 Cf. Loayza Tamayo v. Peru. Merits. Judgment of September 17, 1997. Series C No. 33, para. 43; Case of Ríos et al., supra note 18, para. 89, and Case of Perozo et al., supra note 18, para. 103. 56 Among other considerations the representatives indicated that: (a) Sadi Pansera’s statement merely listed the State entities that combated violence in rural areas, their functions and action plans, without presenting information on the impact of their actions on reducing or eliminating the problem. In addition, the representatives presented statistical data in order to prove “to the Court the ineffectiveness of the public policies mentioned by [the said] witness”; and (b) the witness, Rolf Hackbart, gave “merely a general description of the agrarian reform policy and the entities responsible for implementing it[, without presenting] information on the results of this policy.” The representatives countered the affirmation of the witness with the data contained in the expert opinion of Sérgio Sauer. Regarding the Brazilian legislation on freedom of association, mentioned in the testimony, the representatives stated that they had not alleged the inexistence of these norms, but rather that State agents had violated them. Cf. Briefs of the representatives of November 19 and 28, 2008 (merits file, tome IV, folios 1063, 1064, 1097 and 1098). 57 Among other considerations, the State indicated that: (a) in her testimony, Teresa Cofré had “extrapolated the purpose of her statement and expressed an opinion without presenting supporting documents regarding the supposed unlawful actions of law enforcement agents and members of the judiciary in the state of Paraná.” The State refuted the testimony as regards the affirmations that the Secretary of Public Security of the state of Paraná at the time had decided on the dissemination of the recorded tapes and that the Court of Justice had refused the request to destroy them; (b) the testimony of Marli Brambilla Kappaum showed that she was unaware of many of