DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE A.A. CANÇADO TRINDADE 1. I regret that I am unable to share the decision taken by the majority of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in the second operative paragraph, and the approach adopted on this point in considering paragraphs 66 to 79 of the judgment on preliminary objections in the Serrano Cruz Sisters v. El Salvador, because the Court has admitted the first preliminary objection ratione temporis filed by the defendant State, which was intended to exclude the Court from considering facts or acts that commenced prior to the date on which the State recognized the Court’s contentious jurisdiction (June 6, 1995), and that continue after the date of recognition. I will now explain the legal grounds for my dissenting position on this issue. 2. In doing so, I will also explain my position on a question of capital importance relating to compulsory international jurisdiction (based on the acceptance of the optional clause on compulsory jurisdiction) of an international human rights tribunal such as the Inter-American Court. The reflections that I will develop in this dissenting opinion will cover the following points: first, an evaluation lex lata of compulsory international jurisdiction; second, the juridical effect of the specific formulation of the optional clause in Article 62 of the American Convention on Human Rights (numerus clausus); third, my considerations de lege ferenda on compulsory international jurisdiction within the framework of the American Convention on Human Rights; fourth, jus cogens in the convergence between international humanitarian law and international human rights law; and, fifth, the recurring search for automatic compulsory international jurisdiction as a necessity of our times. I. Preliminary considerations 3. I do not believe that it is necessary to repeat here what I have stated in my concurring opinions in previous judgments on preliminary objections in the Hilaire, Benjamin and Constantine cases (2001), in relation to Trinidad and Tobago, on the preceding question of the compétence de la compétence (Kompetenz Kompetenz) of the Inter-American Court in the matter under discussion, because my reflections have long been accepted by the Court and today form part of its consistent case law in this regard. Additionally, I do not consider it necessary to go into the origin and evolution of the establishment of the optional clause on compulsory jurisdiction, and examine international practice in this regard; this has already been explained in detail in my abovementioned concurring opinions in the said Hilaire, Benjamin and Constantine case. 4. On this specific point, I will restrict myself to recalling that the original purpose of the establishment of the optional clause on compulsory jurisdiction (created in 1920) – a clause that has survived in Article 62 of the American Convention – was to attract acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) and subsequently of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), and also of the European Court of Human Rights (prior to Protocol No. 11 to the European Convention on Human Rights), by the greatest possible number of States parties to the respective multilateral treaties. Currently, this question is only posed in relation to the European Court, which today (with Protocol No. 11) is endowed with automatic compulsory jurisdiction – a