obligations caused by the proceedings – that is, his judicial situation.’ It is possible that the latter could have little relevance on this situation; if this is not so, that is, if the relevance increases, until it is intense, it would be necessary, for the sake of justice and security, both seriously threatened, that the process be more diligent so that the subject’s situation, which has begun to seriously affect his life, may be decided in a short time – ‘reasonable time.’ The impairment must be real, not simply possible or probable, eventual or remote.” 10. I added: “I am aware that these concepts do not have the precision I would want, as in the case of others provided for the analysis of the reasonableness of the time period: complexity of the matter, behavior of the interested party, behavior of the judge. Certainly this is information subject to a reasoned examination; references that must be assessed as a whole, within certain circumstances that are not the same in all cases. The reasonableness of the time period will be inferred from this totality and the assessment of the Court will be supported, in each case, by the excess incurred in and the violation committed.” 11. I again referred to this issue in my opinions relating to the judgments in the Sawhoyamaxa (Paraguay) case, of March 29, and the Ituango Massacres (Colombia) case, of July 1, 2006. Finally, in the judgment in the case of Valle Jaramillo et al., the InterAmerican Court has expanded its consideration of reasonable time and incorporated the elements to asses it that I suggested in the personal opinions mentioned above. This acceptance is based on the conviction that, in addition to the factors established by European case law and incorporated by inter-American case law – or together with them – it is essential to assess the greater or lesser harm caused by the time - also greater or lesser – that elapses in the processing and deciding of a dispute or in the definition of an obligation or a right. 12. At times, when weighing the harm, the time elapsed is irrelevant; in others, it is very detrimental to the victim. Consequently, the other elements used to assess reasonableness – complexity of the matter and conduct of authorities and private individuals – should also be examined in light of the prejudice that is being caused to the victim. Time does not elapse equally for everyone, and the elements usually taken into consideration to establish the reasonableness of time do not affect everyone in the same way. I realize that it is possible to identify weaknesses in this argument, but I also maintain that the inclusion of this new item of information helps improve the definition of reasonable time and give greater precision to the concept. 13. I must emphasize that it is not my purpose to replace the elements of traditional legal doctrine and concentrate all the consequences of measuring reasonable time on the harm caused; on no account. Nor have I suggested that a lack of appreciable harm legitimates the passage of time, whatsoever the length, and absolves the State of responsibility as regards due process; on no account. I am merely suggesting the pertinence of looking at the traditional elements of measurement also – and only, also – from the optic or the perspective of the actual harm that the passage of time causes to the victim. This constitutes an additional factor in the assessment, which should be combined with the other factors considered to measure the reasonableness of the elapsed time. 14. This idea has now been introduced into the Inter-American Court’s case law as of this judgment handed down in the case of Valle Jaramillo et al. Indeed, it enhances the examination of the time period and enhances the decision adopted by the Court in this regard, when it states: “The Court has established that three elements must be taken into account in order to determine whether the time is reasonable: (a) the complexity of the matter; (b) the procedural activity of the interested party, and (c) the conduct of the judicial authorities. In addition, the Court finds it pertinent to clarify that, in this analysis of