the admissibility requirement of prior exhaustion of remedies under domestic law in accordance with Article 46.2 of the Convention as Peruvian anti-terrorist law does not afford due process of law. B. The State 38. The State indicates that the petitioner was arrested by the police in conjunction with the public prosecutor’s office (Ministerio Público) and brought to trial for the crime of terrorism, with all due guarantees. She was initially acquitted, but the Supreme Court subsequently declared the finding of the court of first instance void and ordered a new oral hearing to be launched. 39. In its allegations relating to the present petition, the State says that the petitioner, Jesús Mónica Feria Tinta, was arrested by the police while with her sister Rubeth Natalia Feria Tinta, on April 13, 1992, and that a representative of the public prosecutor’s office (Ministerio Público) participated throughout the investigation. The State also claims that when the petitioner’s house was searched in the presence of a lawyer, weapons, ammunition, and subversive documentation were found. The State further claims that a representative of the public prosecutor’s office and the petitioner’s own defense lawyer were present and participated when she made her statement to police. 40. The State claims that the arrest of the petitioner and her sister took place on April 13, 1992, and that they were released to judicial authorities via the Prosecuting Attorney’s office (Fiscalía Penal) on April 28, 1992, meaning that they were under arrest for 15 days, in accordance with Article 12 (c) of Decree Law No. 25475 and in line with the Political Constitution of Peru for a case concerning the alleged crime of terrorism. 41. The State points out that the petitioner’s claim that she was subjected to the violation of her human rights at the hands of DICONTE police officers are false, and that at all times DICONTE personnel acted in accordance with current rules governing anti-terrorism efforts. Furthermore, the State claims that the petitioner exercised her right to legal protection, as she was assisted by her defense lawyer in relation to the charges against her. 42. Additionally, the State affirms that because the petitioner fled the country in August 1993 while legal proceedings against her were pending, she is guilty of evasion, and therefore she would have to comply with the law and appear before the Peruvian justice system, which offers due legal process and guarantee of rights. 43. Furthermore, with regard to the admissibility requirements of the instant petition, the State says that in June 1993, the Superior Court of Lima acquitted the petitioner at first instance. Subsequently, in December 1993, the Supreme Court declared void the sentence handed down by the Superior Court and ordered new oral proceedings to be opened. Therefore, as the proceedings indicate that the petition was lodged with the Commission on the 17th of June 1997, it would have been filed extemporaneously, exceeding the allowed period for the presentation of petitions. The State also adds that the petitioner did not claim that there existed any impediment or insurmountable obstacle preventing her from appealing in the time allowed, in an exercise of her rights before this legal body. 44. Consequently, the State claims that the petitioner has not exhausted the remedies available under domestic law in relation to the present case and that, on the contrary, there are still legal proceedings at her disposal. Therefore, in recent communications relating to the preparation of the present report, the State presented up-to-date information from which it can be seen that in the judgment dated January 24, 2006, the National Criminal Court declared it had grounds to continue to the oral proceedings (juicio oral) against the accused, Jesús Mónica Feria Tinta, for the crimes of Disturbing the Peace, Disturbing the Public Peace, Advocating Criminal Behavior to the detriment of the State, and for Terrorism against the 6