8 that had there been no violations on the State’s part, the time and effort of his attorneys would never have been needed. 37. From the State’s comments it is evident that the State’s understanding is that the amounts it must pay to Mr. Suárez Rosero’s attorneys would be for fees. However, from a reading of the judgment on reparations, particularly its paragraphs 20.g and 94, it is patently clear that a significant portion of the amounts ordered is for reimbursement of expenses that the State had already agreed to pay during the reparations phase. 38. The State, moreover, has not explained why it believes that its tax laws apply to the costs awarded for Mr. Richard Wilson, who worked as counsel for the victim from the American University’s Human Rights Clinic in the United States, and a portion of the costs awarded for the victim’s other attorney, Mr. Alejandro Ponce Villacís, who conducted some of his business out of this office. 39. The Court believes it would be useful to explain the considerations upon which it based its decision. 40. In its recent case law, and particularly since the current Rules of Procedure entered into force, the Court has recognized that costs are one element to be considered under the concept of reparations to which Article 63(1) of the Convention refers since they are a natural consequence of the effort made by the victim, his or her beneficiaries, or representatives to obtain a court settlement recognizing the violation committed and establishing its legal consequences (Garrido and Baigorria Case, Reparations (Art. 63(1) American Convention on Human Rights), Judgment of September 3, 1998. Series C No. 39, para. 79) 41. In this context, the amount of the payment ordered for Mr. Suárez Rosero’s attorneys was considered, at the time, fair and reasonable. The very essence of the Court’s judgment on this point is that as part of the fair compensation of which Article 63(1) of the Convention speaks, it is both “fair” and “reasonable” that the victim’s attorneys should receive said amounts promptly and in full. Were the State to deduct some percentage of those amounts for tax purposes, the amount received by the attorneys would not be the amount that the Court approved. This would constitute noncompliance with the judgment on reparations. 42. The Court’s interpretation of this point is consistent with its case law (see, inter alia, Loayza Tamayo Case, Reparations (Art. 63(1) American Convention on Human Rights), Judgment of November 27, 1998. Series C No. 42, operative paragraph nine; and Blake Case, Reparations (Art. 63(1) American Convention on Human Rights), Judgment of January 22, 1999. Series C No. 48, operative paragraph four) and with that of the European Court of Human Rights, which, when it orders payment of costs, either orders the State to add on any taxes that may be owed (see, inter alia, European Court of Human Rights, Bulut v. Austria, judgment of 22 February 1996, Report of judgments and decisions 1996-II, operative paragraph four) or makes the calculation itself and orders payment of the resulting amount (see, inter alia, European Court of Human Rights, Young, James and Webster, judgment of 18 October 1982 (Article 50), Series A No. 55, operative paragraph two). 43. Both the Commission and Mr. Suárez Rosero suggested ways to avoid any adverse consequences to the attorneys by reason of taxes. The Court considers that