9 convention that we are analyzing, given that part of the deeply rooted connotation of the “diffused control of conformity with the Convention” is in comparison to the “concentrated control” carried out in the constitutional States by its highest “constitutional judicial entities,” upon which the Tribunals, Courts, or Constitutional Chambers, and in some cases the Supreme Courts and other high judicial bodies, have the last constitutional interpretation. Thus, the “concentrated control of conformity with the Convention” has been developed by the I/A Court of H.R. since its very first judgments, submitting the actions and norms of the State, in each particular case, to an examination of said conformity. That “concentrated control” was carried out, fundamentally, by the I/A Court of H.R.. Now, it has been transformed into a “diffused control of conformity with the Convention” by extending said “control” to all the domestic judges as a requirement for action within the domestic forum, although the I/A Court of H.R. retains its power as “last interpreter of the American Convention” when the effective protection of human rights in the domestic forum is not achieved.35 23. It involves an “extensive system of control (vertical and general)” as has been rightly highlighted by the former Inter-American judge Sergio García Ramírez. In this regard, his reflections are illustrative, those of which are expressed in his concurring opinion in the Judgment rendered in the Case of the Dismissed Congressional Employees (Aguado Alfaro et al.) v. Peru:36 4. On other occasions, I have compared the function of international human rights tribunals to the mission of national constitutional courts. The latter are responsible for safeguarding the rule of law through their decisions concerning the subordination of acts of governmental authorities to the supreme law of the nation. A case law of principles and values (principles and values of the democratic system) has arisen in the development of constitutional justice, which illustrates the direction taken by the State, provides security to the individual, and establishes the route and the boundaries for the work of the State’s organs. Considered from another angle, the control of constitutionality, as an assessment of and a decision on the act of the governmental authority put on trial, is entrusted to a high-ranking organ within the State’s jurisdictional structure (concentrated control) or assigned to diverse jurisdictional bodies in the case of matters they hear pursuant to their respective competences (diffuse[d] control). 12. This control of “conventionality” [control for conformity with the convention]– on the successful results of which the increased dissemination of the regime of guarantees depends – can have (as has occurred in some countries) a diffuse[d] nature; in other words, it can be in the hands of all the courts when they have to decide cases in which the provisions of international human rights treaties are applicable. 13. This would allow an extensive (vertical and general) system of control of the legality of the acts of governmental authorities to be drawn up – as regards the conformity of such acts to international human rights norms – without prejudice to the fact that the source of interpretation of the 35 Cf. Ferrer Mac-Gregor, Eduardo, “El control difuso de convencionalidad en el Estado constitucional”, [The diffused control of conformity with the Convention in the constitutional State] in Fix-Zamudio, Héctor, and Valadés, Diego (coords.), Formación y perspectiva del Estado mexicano, [Formation and persepective of the Mexican State] México, El Colegio Nacional-UNAM, 2010, pp. 151188. 36 Case of Dismissed Congressional Employees (Aguado Alfaro et al.) v. Perú, supra note 15, para. 4, 12, and 13 of the concurring opinion.