23 61. Thus, the judges of the States Parties of the Convention are also obligated to comply with the norms of the Convention and the doctrine of "diffused control of conformity with the Convention" facilitates this work, in order to make interpretations of the national provisions (including the constitutional text) that are in conformity with the Inter-American corpus juris and to not apply those that are in absolute contravention of the aforementioned "block of conventionality," to avoid that in such a manner the State to which they belong is internationally responsible for violating international commitments acquired in the field of human rights. 62. The “diffused control of conformity with the Convention" is also based on Article 29 of the Pact of San José, to the extent that all the powers and bodies of the signatory States of said international instrument, including judges and bodies that administrate justice which materially perform judicial functions, are obligated, through their interpretations, to allow the widest possible enjoyment and exercise of the rights and freedoms recognized in the Convention and its additional protocols (and other international instruments in the terms analyzed above), 81 which implies, in turn, restrictive interpretations when it comes to their limitations, always in the light of the jurisprudence of the I/A Court of HR. 63. It does not go unnoticed that Article 68(1) establishes that the States Party to the Pact of San José “are committed to compliance with the decisions of the Court in all cases where they are parties.” The foregoing cannot limit in the sense that the jurisprudence of the I/A Court of H.R. acquires “direct effect” in all national States that have expressly recognized its jurisdiction, regardless of whether it stems from a matter where they have not participated formally as a "material part,” since the I/A Court of H.R. is the international judicial body of the InterAmerican System for the Protection of Human Rights, whose essential function is the application and interpretation of the Convention, its interpretations acquire the same degree of effectiveness as the text of the convention. In other words, the norms of the Convention which should be applied by States are a result of the interpretations of the provisions of the Pact of San José (and its additional protocols, as well as other international instruments). The interpretations carried out by the I/A Court of H.R. are projected in two dimensions: (i) in achieving its effectiveness in the particular case with subjective effects, and (ii) in establishing general effectiveness with the effects of interpreted norms. From there, the logic and necessity of the ruling, aside from notifying the State party in the particular controversy, must also be ”transmitted to the State parties of the Convention,” 82 for them to have full understanding of the normative conventional content derived from the interpretation of the I/A Court of H.R., as the “last interpreter” of the Inter-American corpus juris. IV. THE DIFFUSED CONTROL OF CONFORMITY WITH THE CONVENTION BY MEXICAN JUDGES 64. The prior characteristics of the jurisprudential doctrine of “diffused control of conformity with the Convention” apply for the Mexican judicial system. To date, this has been reiterated in four cases regarding complaints against the Mexican State: Rosendo Radilla Pacheco v. the United Mexican States (2009);83 Fernández Ortega et al. v. México (2010);84 Rosendo Cantú et al. v. México (2010);85 and Cabrera García and Montiel Flores v. México (2010).86 81 Cf. supra para. 44 to 52 in his concurring opinion. 82 Art. 69 of the American Convention on Human Rights. 83 Supra note 19, para. 338 to 342. 84 Supra note 22, para. 233 to 238.