5 the “merits” of the matter and not as an issue of a “preliminary objection,” as that is where the “examination of conformity with the convention” of the domestic actions taken in light of the American Convention are carried out, as well as the interpretation made of it by the I/A Court of H.R. III. THE DOCTRINE OF THE “DIFFUSED CONTROL OF COMPLIANCE” AND ITS SPECIFICATIONS IN THE PRESENT CASE A. RISE AND REITERATION OF THE DOCTRINE 13. The doctrine of the “control of compliance” arose in 200611 in the Case of Almonacid Arellano v. Chile:12 123. The above mentioned legislative obligation established by Article 2 of the Convention is also aimed at facilitating the work of the Judiciary so that the law enforcement authority may have a clear option in order to solve a particular case. However, when the Legislative Power fails to set aside and / or adopts laws which are contrary to the American Convention, the Judiciary is bound to honor the obligation to respect rights as stated in Article 1(1) of the said Convention, and consequently, it must refrain from enforcing any laws contrary to such Convention. The observance by State agents or officials of a law which violates the Convention gives rise to the international liability of such State, as contemplated in International Human Rights Law, in the sense that every State is internationally responsible for the acts or omissions of any of its powers or bodies for the violation of internationally protected rights, pursuant to Article 1(1) of the American Convention. 13 124. The Court is aware that domestic judges and courts are bound to respect the rule of law, and therefore, they are bound to apply the provisions in force within the legal system. But when a State has ratified an international treaty such as the American Convention, its judges, as part of the State, are also bound by such Convention. This forces them to see that all the effects of the provisions embodied in the Convention are not adversely affected by the enforcement of laws which are contrary to its purpose and that have not had any legal effects since their inception. In other words, the Judiciary must exercise a sort of “conventionality control [control of compliance]” between the domestic legal provisions which are applied to specific cases and the American Convention on Human Rights. To perform this task, the Judiciary has to take into account not only the treaty, but also the interpretation thereof made by the Inter-American Court, which is the ultimate interpreter of the American Convention. (underlining added). 11 Previosly, the “control of compliance” has been referenced in some concurring opinions by the judge Sergio García Ramírez. Cf. His opinions in the Case of Myrna Mack Chang v. Guatemala, resovlved on November 25, 2003, para. 27; Case of Tibi v. Ecuador, of September 7, de 2004, para. 3; Case of Vargas Areco v. Paraguay, supra note 8, para. 6 and 12. 12 Case of Almonacid Arellano v. Chile. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of September 26, 2006. Series C No. 154, para. 123 to 125. 13 Cf. Case of Ximenes Lopes v. Brazil. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of July 4, 2006. Series C No. 149, para. 172; and Case of Baldeón García v. Perú. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of April 6, 2006. Series C No. 147, para. 140.