80 jurisdiction objectively assessed. The possibility that the military courts prosecute any soldier who is accused of an ordinary crime, for the mere fact of being in service, implies that the jurisdiction is granted due to the mere circumstance of being a soldier. In that sense, even when the crime is committed by soldiers while they are still in service or based on acts of the same, this is not enough for their knowledge to correspond to the military criminal justice.311 206. In the case of Radilla Pacheco the Tribunal considered that the provision contained in said article 57 operates as a rule and not as an exception, a necessary characteristic of military jurisdiction for it to comply with the standards established by this Court.312 In this regard, the Court emphasizes that compliance with said standards is made with the investigation into all violations of human rights within the framework of ordinary criminal jurisdiction, and thus the scope of application cannot be limited to specific violations, such as torture, forced disappearance or rape. The Tribunal recalls that article 2 of the American Convention establishes the general obligation of each State Party to adapt its domestic laws to the Convention’s provisions, so as to guarantee the rights therein protected, which means that the provision of domestic law must be effective (principle of effet utile).313 Consequently, the Court concludes that the State failed to comply with the obligation contained in article 2, in connection with articles 8 and 25 of the American Convention, upon extending the competence of the military jurisdiction to crimes that do not have a strict relation to military discipline or to juridical rights characteristic of the military realm. 207. Finally, regarding the codification of the crime of torture at the federal level, the representatives indicated that Article 3 of the Mexican Federal Law to Prevent and Punish Torture restricts the motive of the torture to the following premise: “to obtain, from the tortured or a third party, information or a confession, or to punish him or her for an act that he or she has committed or is suspected of having committed, or coerce him or her to behave or stop behaving in a certain way,” which would not comply with the definition enshrined in article 2 of the American Convention and articles 1 and 6 of the Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture. Similarly, they emphasized that, in the Criminal Code of the State of Guerrero, there is no criminal classification for the crime of torture. For its part, the State indicated that both the Convention and the Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture “establish a general obligation for the State to classify the crime of torture, but not the obligation to stipulate a definition literally based on the terms of the Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture.” In addition, the Mexican State argued that, according to Article 3 of the Federal Law to Prevent and Punish Torture, “the crime of torture is regulated in all federal entities, both in criminal codes and special laws.” In this regard, the Court notes that the representatives put forward this argument concerning the violation of Article 2 of the American Convention without stating the reasons why the above had an effect on the instant case. Therefore, and as the Tribunal has held on 311 Case of Radilla Pacheco v. Mexico, supra note 302, para. 286; Case of Fernandez Ortega et al v. Mexico, supra note 39, para. 178; and Case of Rosendo Cantú et al v. Mexico, supra note 30, para. 162. 312 Cf. Case of Durand and Ugarte v. Perú. Merits. Judgment of August 16, 2000. Series C N°. 68, para. 117; Case of Fernandez Ortega et al v. Mexico, supra note 39, para. 179; and Case of Rosendo Cantú et al v. Mexico, supra note 30, para. 163. 313 Cf. Case of Garrido and Baigorria v. Argentina. Reparations and Costs. Judgment of August 27, 1998. Series C N. 39, para. 68; Case of Fernandez Ortega et al v. Mexico, supra note 39, para. 179; and Case of Rosendo Cantú et al v. Mexico, supra note 30, para. 163.